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INTRODUCTION

One of the catalysts for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the efforts of
Citizens for Tax Justice ("CTJ"), a Washington-based think tank.
Working with data from annual reports to shareholders and to the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), CTJ documented that some
of the largest, most profitable corporations in the country were paying
little or no federal income taxes. Indeed, General Electric during a three
year period actually received tax refunds of $283 million despite pre-tax
domestic profits of over $6.5 billion. Six other companies-Boeing, Dow
Chemical, Tenneco, Santa Fe Southern Pacific, Weyerhaeuser, and Du
Pont-received net benefits or refunds in excess of $100 million each,
notwithstanding profits totaling $9.8 billion.1 According to
Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House of
Representatives Ways and Means Committee, the public outcry that
resulted from the disclosure of the nominal federal income taxes paid by
some of the largest corporations in the country was one of the keys to the
sweeping 1986 changes that broadened the base, lowered the rates, and
provided more uniform treatment of taxpayers. "When people look at
1.

CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, THE RESURGENCE OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT

&

CORPORATE INCOME TAXES: IT'S WORKING, BUT ... (1989); see also ROBERT S.
M CINTYRE & ROBERT FOLEN, C iTiZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, C ORPORATE INCOME T AXES
INTHE REAGANYEARS (1984).
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their own tax bills and then hear that big, profitable corporations are
able to manipulate the system to escape taxation, 'that's when the
'
revolution comes.'"
CTJ's work had a profound effect on educating the public about the
need for corporate tax reform. The 1986 Tax Reform Act was ultimately
supported by many in the business community. 3 But CTJ's work cannot be
replicated at the state level. SEC reports and annual shareholder
reports contain information on the aggregate amount of state and local
4
income taxes, but the information is not broken down state-by-state.
And, until very recently, only Wisconsin allowed the public to obtain
information on the amount of state income tax paid by specific
corporations. s
In the past several years, attention has turned increasingly to the
states. Cutbacks in federal aid and the recession, which continue to
plague parts of the country, as well as tangible and intangible factors
have resulted in ongoing budget problems. Corporate tax payments, in
many states, have continued to decline and to vary in ways that seem
unrelated to economic conditions. These developments, together with the
enactment of an increasing number of corporate tax incentives at the state
level, have led many analysts to conclude that information about the
impact of state tax systems on specific corporations is necessary for
intelligent tax policy making.
Corporations pay over $20 billion annually in state corporate income
taxes, but the lack of information on the amount of state income tax paid
and credits taken by specific corporations in each state makes it
impossible to evaluate the extent to which the corporate tax burden is
allocated fairly or rationally in relationship to measures of
profitability. Nor is it possible to analyze accurately the effectiveness
of the billions of dollars expended annually in state tax incentives
because it is not known which corporations receive what type of
incentives and in what amounts.
2. David E.Rosenbaum, Public Push Seen for Tax Shifts, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar.
27, 1985, at Dl.
3. Citizens for Tax Justice has been given credit for playing a key role in the
passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S.
M URRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH 11-13, 88 (1987). For a fuller description of
CTJ's work, see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
For an example of the support of major sectors of the business community of
the 1986 changes, see Statement of Harry Sullivan, on behalf of the Tax Reform
Action Coalition ("TRAC") before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives on The Impact, Effectiveness and Fairness of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (Feb. 7, 1990).
4. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
5. See infra part II.D.

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

122"373

In 1987, an unpublished but widely circulated study by the staff of
the New York Tax Study Commission concluded that the amount of state
corporate income taxes paid and other related information should be
publicly available on a corporation-by-corporation basis. 6 In the last
few years, three states have adopted laws providing for some state-level
disclosure by name of corporation. Arkansas and West Virginia make
available by name of taxpayer-both individuals and corporations-the
amount of selected credits claimed; in Massachusetts, publicly traded
corporations, insurance companies, and most banks, doing business in that
state will soon file an array of state tax information that will then be7
available for public inspection on a corporation-by-corporation basis.
The rest of the states prohibit the disclosure of any corporate tax data by
name of corporation. 8 A number of states, however, are considering a

6. N.Y. LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION AND
SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATION AND THE TAX LAW, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
CORPORATE TAX INFORMATION (1987) [hereinafter N.Y. REPORT]. In the interest of
disclosure, readers should know that the author was Director of the N.Y.
Commission.
7. See infra part. Il.A.
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-2A-10 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 43.05.230 (1990);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-108 (Supp. 1993); CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 19282 (West
1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-113 (1982 & Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
12-15 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 368 (Supp, 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 213.053 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); GA. CODE A NN. § 48-7-60 (Supp. 1993); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 235-116 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 63-3076 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (effective
Jan. 1, 1994); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 35, para. 5/917 (1993); IND, CODE § 6-8.1-7-1 (1991 &
Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.20 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
79-3234 (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131.081 (Baldwin Supp. 1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 47:1508 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 191
(West 1990 & Supp. 1993); MD. CODEANN. TAX GEN. § 13-202 (1990 & Supp. 1992);
M ICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.559(4) (Callaghan Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.611
(West 1989 & Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-83 (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. §
32.057 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-31-507 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-27,119(6)
(Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 364A.100 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 77.19 (1991); N.J. STAT.ANN. § 54:50-8 (West Supp. 1993); N.M STAT. ANN. §
7-1-8 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. TA LAW § 202 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-259 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 57-38-57 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5747.18 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 205 (West Supp. 1994);
OR. REV. STAT. § 314.835 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7408(b) (1990); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 44-11-21 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1680 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-1-28.3 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2-108 (1989); TEXAs
CODE ANN. § 171.206; UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-403 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
3102 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(B) (Michie Supp. 1992).

TURNING THE CLOCK BACK TO THE FUTURE

19931

change in the law to provide greater public access to corporate tax
information.9
Proposals calling for the release of information on the amount of state
corporate income taxes paid and other tax-related data on a corporationby-corporation basis have been treated as innovative, if not radical.
This reaction, however, overlooks the extensive nature of the financial
information, including tax information, that is already in the public
domain because of SEC regulations and generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP").' Moreover, even before SEC-mandated disclosure,
the amount of income taxes paid by corporations and even individuals
was, at various times, public information. In the 1920's, for example,
newspapers trumpeted this information on the front pages." Even today,
a bona fide shareholder of record who owns at least one percent of a
corporation may inspect its tax return and that of its subsidiaries, but
may not disclose any information obtained from the inspection. 12 Far from
an extraordinary measure, calls for disclosure are based on rather
traditional values based principally on the notion that the public as
well as elected officials should be informed about the workings of our
economic and legal systems and that public policy should be made in an
open and informed manner.
This article is organized around five sections. Part I traces the
history of public access to federal tax returns. Besides debunking the
common perception that corporate tax returns have always been immune
from public scrutiny, this historical survey reveals a different story. The
privacy issue was basically fought over the issue of whether individual,
not corporate, tax returns should be public information. When
corporations entered this debate at all, it was essentially with regard to
the privacy of "mom and pop" businesses, which were viewed as the
alter ego's of their owners. Further, the last chapter of this
Congressional debate occurred during the early 1930's and was colored by
the Lindbergh kidnapping and the crime wave that marked the Great
Depression. Individuals feared that if their returns were made public,
they would be marked by kidnappers, con artists, and those of similar
ilk. By way of contrast, when the issue of whether the public should
9. As of May 1993, five states have discussed corporate tax disclosure laws.
See Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy, CORPORATE TAX
DISCLOSURE: GOOD OR BAD FOR THE COMMONWEALTH?, DRAFT WORKING REPORT

(1993), [hereinafter MASSACHUSErS STAFF DRAFT]. For a discussion of this report,
see infra note 182 and accompanying text.

10. See infra part I.G.
11. See, e.g., Income Tax Returns Made Public; J.D. Rockefeller Jr. Paid
$7,435,169; Ford Family and Company Pay $19,000,000 N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1924, at
1.
12.

See I.R.C.

§§ 6103(e)(1)(D)(iii), 6103(a)(3) (1986).
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have access to corporate tax data was debated in 1909 independently of
individual returns, Congress opted for disclosure.
Part I also reviews the disclosure of income tax information that is
mandated by the SEC under its own regulations and by the requirement
that corporations under its jurisdiction follow GAAP. In fact, the amount
of income tax data now subject to disclosure by the SEC and GAAP far
exceeds anything that proponents of disclosure ever hoped to obtain from
Congress.
Part II examines the experiences of the four states that have adopted
some form of corporate tax disclosure legislation. As mentioned
previously, these states are Massachusetts, West Virginia, Arkansas,
and Wisconsin.
Part III analyzes the case for and against state-level disclosure and
concludes that the case in favor of disclosure overwhelmingly outweighs
the counter arguments. Consequently, Part IV discusses the key issues
involved in designing and implementing state-level disclosure laws. A
brief summary is contained in Part IV also.
I. THE DISCLOSURE OF INCOME TAX INFORMATION AT THE FEDERAL
LEVEL: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The heart of the following portion of this article is a study of the
public's access to federal tax return information. This study is organized
chronologically around six key time periods. The first time period is
marked by the Civil War income taxes, which at one time provided for
the publication of the names of individuals and the amount of taxes they
paid. The Civil War income taxes did not apply to corporations. By the
end of the War, however, Congress prohibited this practice.
The Civil War income taxes were followed by a second attempt to
provide for public access to tax return data. The short-lived 1894 Income
Tax apparently reflected the still lingering hostility to the disclosure of
tax information during the Civil War because Congress once again made
it unlawful to publish income tax data.
The next important event occurred with the Tariff Act of 1909, the
predecessor of the modern corporate income tax. Significantly, the 1909
law provided that corporate returns should be open to public inspection.
Almost immediately, opponents of disclosure started to emasculate this
provision. After some political vacillation, Congress provided that
corporate returns should be open to inspection upon order of the President
under rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by
the President.
The 1913 Income Tax, the predecessor of today's personal income tax,
carried over this provision. However, this power was never exercised
very broadly by any president. In reaction, starting in 1918, proponents of
disclosure pressed for broader laws and achieved some minor victories.
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The zenith of the Congressional tax disclosure movement occurred in
1924 when the public was provided access to the names of corporations, as
well as individuals, and the amount of taxes each paid. Two years later,
a backlash was successful in narrowing the law to provide access to only
the names of taxpayers filing returns, but not to the amount of taxes paid.
Advocates of disclosure achieved a hollow victory in 1934 with the
infamous "pink slip" provisions. Corporations and individuals were
required to file a pink slip with their tax returns containing information
on income, deductions, credits, and tax liability. These slips were to be
available for public inspection. Before the effective date of this
requirement, however, a well orchestrated pink slip rebellion occurred
and the law was repealed. This was the last time Congress debated the
general public's access to tax return information.
The final portion of Part I describes the extensive disclosure of
financial and income tax data mandated bk,the SEC and GAAP.
A. The Civil War Income Taxes: 1861-1872
The original Civil War Income Tax Act, passed in 1861,13 provided
that "the said taxes, when so assessed and made public, shall become a
lien on the property or other sources of said income for the amount of the
same..

."14

This provision apparently provided the only reference to

whether tax information was to be made public.' Because the 1861 Act
never became effective, 16 no information exists on how this provision was
to be interpreted.
The 1862 Act, 17 which replaced the 1861 Act, was more explicit than
its predecessor. The 1862 Act provided for a period of fifteen days in
which the public could examine the names of taxpayers and the amount
of their liabilities.' 8 The public was notified of this opportunity through

13. Act of Aug. 5,1861, ch. 45,12 Stat. 292,309 (1861).
14. Id. § 49 (emphasis added).
15. Accord Hubbard v. Blair, T.D. 3661, 27 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 4 (1925). The
Congressional Research Service claims that the original Civil War income tax
statute "did not contain a statement on the publicity of income tax data," but this
assertion is belied by the statutory language quoted in the text accompanying
supra note 14.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HISTORY OF T AX RETURN
6103 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 AND ITS

CONFIDENTIALITY: SECTION

PREDECESSORS 3 [hereinafter RETuRN CONFIDENTIALITYj
16. The 1861 tax was regarded as essentially provisional and Secretary of the
Treasury Chase did not attempt to collect it. DISNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68 (1967).
17. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
18. The Act provided:

(continued)
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newspaper advertisements and other posted notices. Similar provisions
were made for publicizing the collectors lists.' 9
The publishing of the amount of taxes owed was presumably a
response to the lack of mass communication, sufficient administrative
procedures or machinery, or reliable mail systems. The posting of both
"assessor's lists" and "collector's lists" in public places was a means of
notifying taxpayers that they owed taxes, as well as the amount of their
liability, and of the arrival of the tax collector.20 Representative Porter
of Indiana echoed this consensus about the purpose of the publicity
feature: 'Now, what is the object of the [publicity] provision? Obviously
it is to give the tax payer time to collect his money in order to be ready
21
when the collector arrives."
Initially, the 1862 Act was not interpreted so as to permit public
examination of the underlying tax information. 22 Early in 1863, the
Commissioner directed that returns should be available only to tax

And be it further enacted, That the assessors for each collection district
shall, by advertisement in some public newspaper published in each
county within said district, if any such there be, and by written or printed
notifications, to be posted up in at least four public places within each
assessment district, advertise all persons concerned of the time and
place within said county when and where the lists, valuations, and
enumerations made and taken within said county may be examined;
and said lists shall remain open for examination for the space of fifteen
days after notice shall have been given as aforesaid.
Ch. 119, § 5, 12 Stat. at 437.
19. Ch. 119, § 19, 12 Stat. at 439. The Act of 1862 authorized the President to
divide the country into "convenient collection districts," and to appoint with the
advice and consent of the Senate an assessor and collector for each collection
district. Id. The assessor was charged with the duty of locating objects of taxation
and preparing assessment lists to be delivered to the collector. These lists
constituted the warrant of the collector for the collection of assessable taxes.
Those subject to the income tax were required to file an annual return with the
assistant assessor. The assessor heard all appeals and issued summonses to
delinquents. U.S. OFFICE OF INTERNAL REVENUE, HISTORY OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE: 1791-1929, at 4, 5 (1930) (prepared under the direction of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
20. RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY, supra note 15, at 4 ("The imposition of this
provision for advertisement of assessor's lists, therefore, appears to have been
intended to publicize the tax assessment of each citizen, and to communicate to
each citizen his lawful obligation to pay.").
21. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1259 (1862).
22. S. REP. No. 266,94th Cong., 2d SESS. 835 (1975).
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officials23

so that the income tax "might not be felt to be inquisitorial. ' 24
Newspapers strongly urged permission to print tax returns. In a second
ruling, the Commissioner acceded. 25 The Commissioner defended his
action as providing "the amplest opportunity.. for the detection of any
fraudulent returns that may have been made."26 In 1863, the Secretary of
the Treasury's legislative recommendation was to the contrary, however,
requesting that Congress prohibit disclosure of tax returnsY
The Revenue Act of 1864 disregarded this recommendation by
providing that the assessors "submit the proceedings of the assessors...
and the annual lists taken and returned to the inspection of any and all

persons who may apply for that purpose.128

Newspapers began

publishing lists of reported incomes and taxes paid.2 9
Not all newspapers favored disclosure, although some changed their
positions on this issue over time. At the end of 1864, The New York Times
lamented the lack of secrecy. 30 A month later, the New York Tribune
published a list of incomes and wrote an editorial supporting its decision:
"So long as an Income Tax shall be required and levied, we are satisfied
that it is best for all who are honestly concerned therein that there
should be no restriction on giving publicity to the items." 31 About
eighteen months later, The New York Times shifted its views to those of
the Tribune and stated that publicity prevented collusion between
taxpayers and collectors and that only by making tax returns public could
full compliance be secured. The Times asserted that in 1864 and 1865, the

23. RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY, supra note 15, at 5; S. REP. No. 266, supra note
22, at 835.
24. S. REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 835.
25. HARRY E. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY
FROM 1861 to 1871 at 66 (1914).
26. Id. at 67; see also GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL ON THE DIRECT AND
EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 259,70 (1863).
27. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR ENDING
JUNE 30, 1863, at 70 (1863).

28. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 223, 228 (1864) ("[I]t shall be the
duty of the assessor for each collection district, at the time fixed for hearing such
appeal, as aforesaid, to submit the proceedings of the assessors and assistant
assessors, and the annual lists taken and returned as aforesaid, to the inspection
of any and all persons who may apply for that purpose.").
29. See, e.g., War 5 Per Cent Tax, VIth Congressional District on Income of
$5,000 and Over, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 20, 1865, at 5 [hereinafter War Tax].
30. The Internal Revenue Law-Telling Other People's Secrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1864, at 4.
31. Publishing Incomes, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 21, 1865, at 4.
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publicity provisions generated millions of dollars for the government. 32
In opposition, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle argued that
publicity led to the falsification of returns for the purpose of ostentation
and for securing credit.Y
By the end of the Civil War, newspapers customarily published
income tax information.34 Horace Greeley concluded that publicity "has
gone far toward equalizing the payments of income tax by the rogues
with that of honest men."-5 The New York Times continued supporting
publicity:
Show every taxpayer's sworn return of income to his nearest
neighbors, his most intimate friends, to himself, indeed, in public
journals, and you have a security that no laws, no oaths, and no
scrutiny, has or can furnish. In no other way can the income tax
law be so efficiently and so searchingly executed and enforced as
by the regularity
and certainty of the publication of income
36
assessment lists.

While there was certainly a splintered voice of opposition to
disclosure from the start, "objections appeared to arise more frequently
[only] when the major newspapers began to publish the incomes of the
leading citizens."37 Representative (and later President) James A.
Garfield argued that tax returns should be available to the public but
should not be published by newspapers:
Suppose a man has had serious losses during the year, so that
his income would be smaller than people expect it to be. Now, he
would not want to let that be known so as to alarm his creditors
and bring them all down upon him when otherwise he would
come out safely. There is no reason in the world, unless the public
interests require, that the private affairs of individuals should
32. SMITH, supra note 25, at 67.
33. 2 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 162 (1866). This position was
consistent with The New York Times' assertion that disclosure had generated
millions of dollars, although presumably the Times was not attributing this figure
to taxpayers who filed false returns reporting more income than they actually
had.

34. See, e.g., War Tax, supra note 29, at 5; see also KOSSUTH K.

KENNAN,

INCOME TAXATION 251 n.16 (1910); SMITH, supra note 25, at 66-68; Hill, The Civil

War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 436 (1894).
35. Richard F. Janssen, Income Tax Snooping Through History, WALL ST. J.,
May 6, 1970, at 18.
36. The Publication of Incomes, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1866, at 4.
37. RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY, supra note 15, at 6.
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be brought out and paraded in the public papers. I admit that
some sort of publicity is necessary to act as a pressure upon men to
bring out their full incomes, but if the lists are left open for public
inspection it will be an ample pressure upon them.
Arguments such as Garfield's were reinforced by assertions that as tax
officials gained experience, citizen-watchdog assistance was less needed
39
and less justifiable.
As the post Civil War income taxes became unpopular, the publicity
feature was also attacked. In 1869, The New York Times reverted to its
earlier position opposing disclosure, arguing that a properly organized
revenue force could prevent evasion and obviate the nuisance of
publicity. 40 It denounced the publishing of returns as "offensive and
41
objectionable."
In 1870, a new Commissioner prohibited assessors from furnishing tax
lists for publication, although the public was still allowed to inspect
returns. 4 2 This position, which mirrored Garfield's views, was
apparently taken in the hope of "lowering voices" over this increasingly
contentious issue. 3 Congress responded to complaints about disclosure in
1870 by providing that "income tax returns or any part thereof.., shall
not be published." 44 The Civil War Income Tax died at the end of 1871, in
part due to the rising concerns over privacy, which were not entirely put
to rest by the 1870 statutory revision. 45 Because the Civil War income
38. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2789 (1866).
39.
40.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 837.
The Income Tax-Its Repeal or Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1869,

at 4.
41. The Lights & Shadows of the Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1869, at 4.
42. S.REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 839.

43. Janssen, supra note 35, at 18.
44. The Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 11, 16 Stat. 256, 259 (1870), provides:
[N]o collector, deputy collector, assessor, or assistant assessor shall
permit to be published in any manner such income returns, or any part
thereof, except such general statistics, not specifying the names of
individuals or firms, as he may make public, under such rules and
regulations as the commissioner of internal revenue shall prescribe.
Id.
The literature is silent on how this provision was to be interpreted.

Presumably, because the income tax expired shortly after the passage of this law,
there was not enough time or reason for such questions to arise.
45. S.REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 838; see also SMITH, supra note 25, at 68
("Much of the opposition to the tax would never have been raised if it had not
(continued)
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taxes did not apply to corporations,
these concerns about privacy were
46
limited only to individuals.
B. The 1894 Income Tax
The memory of these concerns and of the demise of the income tax
that the publicity provisions had partly caused, was reflected in the
non-disclosure provision of the short-lived revival of the income tax in
1894. 47 The 1894 Act provided, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
print or publish in any manner whatever not provided by law, any income
return or any part thereof."48 Apparently during the floor debates,
been felt that [publicity] was an unnecessary exposure of private affairs. It is very
questionable whether the benefit received from publicity was not entirely offset
by the injury it did, because of the antagonism to the tax which it aroused.").
Garfield also described the publicity features as making the tax "odious in many
parts of the country." EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THEINCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE
HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 452

(1914).

46. By virtue of an administrative directive of the Commissioner, the 1862
Act was interpreted to exclude firms of any sort from taxation. RATNER, supra
note 16, at 76 n.41. The Act imposed the tax on the "annual gains, profits, or
income of every person residing in the United States, whether derived from any
kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, salaries, or from any profession, trade
employment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere." Act of
July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473 (1862). If the word "person" is read to
include entities as well as individuals, which would be today's usage, see I.R.C. §
7701(a)(1) (1986), the 1862 tax would apply to corporations. Elsewhere in the
statute, however, "person" is used to refer to only individuals. See, e.g., ch. 119, §
93, 12 Stat. at 475 ("persons of lawful age"). In any event, by 1864, the law was
clarified. The 1864 Act provided that income was to include the share of any
person of the gains or profits, whether divided or not, of all companies or
partnerships, which suggests that it was the shareholder and not the corporation
that was intended to be taxed on corporate profits. See Act of June 30, 1864, ch.
173, § 173, 13 Stat. 232 (1864). The author has been unable to find any discussion
about the administrative burdens arising from this early approach to integration.
47. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
48. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34,28 Stat. 557-58 (1894) provides:
[Ilt shall be unlawful for any collector, deputy collector, agent, clerk, or
other officer or employee of the United States to divulge or to make
known in any manner whatever not provided by law to any person the
operations, style of work or apparatus of any manufacturer or producer
visited by him in the discharge of his official duties, or the amount or
source of income, profits, losses, expenditures, or any particular thereof,
set forth or disclosed in any income return by any person or corporation,
or to permit any income return or copy thereof or any book containing

(continued)
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Congressmen did not discuss the privacy aspects of the bill. Presumably,
the lessons of the Income Tax Act of 1862 were carried over to the Income
Tax Act of 1894, which required that tax returns be confidential. 49 When
the tax was held unconstitutional in 1895,.0 the Commissioner issued an
order directing that all income tax returns already collected were to be
burned.5'
5 2
Although the earlier tax acts had encompassed only individuals,
the 1894 Act was imposed on both individuals and corporations. 5 3 Thus,
the privacy extended to corporate income tax returns in 1894 was adopted
without the benefit of any debate, arriving virtually on the coattails of
the lingering public sentiment about the privacy of individual returns.
When, however, Congress adopted a tax on only corporations, as was true
in 1909, it was willing to move in the direction of disclosure.

any abstract or particulars thereof, to be seen or examined by any
person except as provided by law; and it shall be unlawful for any person
to print or publish in any manner whatever not provided by law, any
income return or any part thereof or the amount or source of income,
profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income return; and any
offense against the foregoing provision shall be a misdemeanor and be

punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the
court; and if the offender be an officer or employee of the United States
he shall be dismissed from office and be incapable thereafter of holding
any office under the Government.
Id.

The reference to divulging the operations, style of work, or apparatus of any
manufacturer or producer was originally adopted in 1864 in ch. 173, § 38, 13 Stat.
238 (later codified in R.S. 3167 (1878)). In 1864, there was no reference to the
disclosure of income tax returns. That language was added as part of the 1894
income tax.
49.

50.
51.
note 35,
52.
53.

RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY, supra note

15, at 10.

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
See 56 CONG. REC. 10,167-68 (1918) (letter of Cordell Hull); Janssen, supra
at 18.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Ch. 349, § 28 Stat. at 556.
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C. The Tariff Act of 1909
In 1909, Congress passed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act,5 4 the

predecessor of the modern corporate income tax, and once again the
disclosure issue was resurrected. Because the Payne-Aldrich Act did not
apply to individuals, this was the first time the disclosure issue was
debated solely in the context of corporations. Significantly, the 1909
law, contrary to the 1894 Act, provided that corporate returns "shall
constitute public records and be open to inspection as such.""
No statements in the hearings or reports regarding the underlying
rationale for this provision exist,5 6 but from the surrounding discussion

and events, Congress' willingness to adopt a different privacy standard
for corporations than for individuals becomes clear. By 1909, the growing
labor movement and the still-fresh legacy of former President Theodore
Roosevelt's well-publicized trust-busting campaign had created a
widespread popular distrust of corporations. Although "[tihe legislative
history does little to illuminate [the publicity] provisions, 5 7 it seems
likely that the new national mood had much to do with the reversal of
disclosure policy.
Floor debate on the Tariff Act provides a barometer of the country's
mood. Senator Boume, for example, praised the publicity provisions:
[Tihe Government, at least, will have cognizance of all
corporation earnings, and a method is provided by which the
stockholders may secure such information, since the returns to the
Government become public records. Thus will be eliminated in
the future the possibility of concealed equities; corporation
melon cuttings' will be done away with; the responsibility of
corporation management to all the stockholders will be
established; the holder of one share of stock will have
opportunity of acquiring as much information concerning
corporation affairs as the owner of 100,000 shares.
Corporations will be popularized and "peopleorized;" the
tendency will be for people to invest their earnings in corporation
securities on the assumption that the publicity feature and

54.
55.
56.
57.

Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 116 (1909).
Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. at 11,116.
RETURN CONFIDENTrALITY, supra note 15, at 10.
S. REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 840.
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greater opportunity for governmental supervision will protect
their investments...
Senator Bourne also felt that disclosing corporate returns would
uncover and discourage dishonest business practices and bookkeeping.
"All legitimate business should welcome this legislation, and only the
business pirate need fear and oppose it."59 To Senator Bourne, the public
disclosure of corporate returns was one of the most significant provisions
of the corporate income tax. 60 Other senators, who only marginally
supported the corporate income tax law, were nonetheless strong
defenders of the disclosure of corporate returns. 61 President William
Howard Taft, who vigorously defended the disclosure of corporate
income tax returns, played an important part in winning the support of
the progressive element of the Republican Party.62 He believed that the
publicity feature of the law was more valuable than the tax's revenue
63
potential.
Shortly after the passage of the 1909 Tariff Act, opponents started an
active campaign to weaken the publicity features. Small corporations,
especially those whose securities were not listed on the exchanges, and
thus were not accustomed to providing any public information, lobbied
hard against the broad 1909 publicity feature. 64 This opposition was
spearheaded by the Illinois Manufacturers' Association, which held a
conference of industrial and commercial associations in 1910, described as

58. 44 CONG. REc. 4000 (1909).
59. Id. at 4000-01.
60. Id. at 4001.
61. Id. at 4006.
62. Maurice H. Robinson, The Federal Corporation Tax, 1 AM. ECON. REV.
691, 707-08 (1911); S.Doc. REP. No. 98, 61st Cong., 1st Sess. Ironically, when the
law was changed in 1924 to permit the publication of the names of both
individuals and corporations and the amount of taxes paid, see infra part E, note
84 and accompanying text, The New York Times trumpeted the amount paid by
Charles Taft, the former President's brother. (At the time of publication, former
President Taft was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.) See Charles P. and His
Wife of Cincinnati File Return of $440,729, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at A2.
63. Letter from Archie Butt to Clara Butt (Jan. 20, 1911), in 1 TAFT AND
ROOSEVELT: THE INTMATE LETTERS OF A RCHIE BUTT, MILITARY A IDE, at 262-63
(1930).
64. Robinson, supra note 62, at 708. These groups had a friend in Franklin
MacVeagh, President Taft's Secretary of the Treasury, who said that if he were
subject to the disclosure law, he would do all he could "to evade the law." RATNER,
supra note 16, at 295. "The amazing statement made by MacVeagh as a
responsible government official was surpassed by the campaign of invective
against the tax released by businessmen." Id.
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"the first gun for a national movement which has in view the uniting of
all" 65 who sought to eliminate disclosure. The basic argument was
premised on the notion that the disclosure provisions discriminated
between the larger and smaller corporations, 66as well as between
corporations and partnerships and proprietorships.
Within a month of the 1910 conference, the Commissioner issued his
first decision on administering the publicity features of the Act. He ruled
that because Congress had made no specific appropriation for public
inspection of the returns, the records would be treated as confidential. 67
In effect, this ruling suspended the publicity provisions unless Congress
provided financing. The Illinois Manufacturers' Association claimed
68
credit for this administrative victory.
In response to the Commissioner's shifting the onus onto the
legislative branch, Congress appropriated $25,000 for the purpose of
classifying, indexing, and exhibiting tax returns, but provided the
significant condition that "any and all such returns shall be open to
inspection only upon order of the President under rules and regulations to
be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by the
President."'69 Presumably, Congress intended by this provision to back
away from the public disclosure of corporate returns.70 Some felt this
compromise sorely undermined the benefits of the publicity feature and
granted too much power to the President. Representative Underwood, for
example, presented the following argument:

RATNER, supra note 16, at 295.
66. To be sure, this discrimination could have been eliminated by providing
that individual returns should also be open to inspection, but this position was
not part of the Association's agenda. There are, however, legitimate reasons for
distinguishing between corporations and individuals. See infra part III.F. and
IV.A. Removing individuals from the ambit of disclosure recognizes that they
have more legitimate rights of privacy than do corporations. If individuals are
not covered, opponents of corporate disclosure can then assert that corporations
are being unfairly treated. This argument, however, is disingenuous because
such opponents are not interested in extending disclosure to individuals but only
in scuttling disclosure for corporations.
67. T.D. 1594, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 20 (1910).
68. Robinson, supra note 62, at 708-09. The 1909 Act was challenged as
unconstitutional. According to one commentator, the publicity features, which
were considered to be a very important feature of the bill, were not enforced until
the Act was upheld in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). KENNAN, supra
note 34, at 286. The ourt upheld the Act against charges that the inspection of
corporate returns violated the Fourth Amendment. Flint, 220 U.S. at 176-77.
69. Act of June 17,1910, ch. 297; 36 Stat. 468, 494 (1910).
70. S. REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 841.

65.
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If you pass this amendment and the President of the United
States wants to use the publicity as a whip over any corporation
of this country, he can do so.... If you are going to have publicity
of any kind, why not have honest, straightforward, full
publicity, and let all the world know what is going on, and not a
subterfuge of this kind.7
Pursuant to this Congressional delegation, the Secretary of the
Treasury, with the approval of the President, provided access to
corporate returns under two broad circumstances. First, bona fide
shareholders could apply for permission to inspect the tax returns of
their corporations by simply making out a showing of cause. The
Secretary had full discretion in deciding whether to grant permission.
Second, anyone could inspect the returns of corporations listed on public
exchanges, if the stock was advertised in the press or offered for public
sale by the corporation itself.7 Returns were open to inspection, however,
only at the office of the Commissioner. Provisions for furnishing a copy of
any return to any person were not available. 73 Further, the Act made it
unlawful for anyone to print or publish, in any manner not provided by
law, any income tax return or any part thereof. 74 This provision was
commonly interpreted as preventing the publication of information
obtained from inspecting returns.
D. 1913 -1923
The 1913 Income Tax Act was applicable both to individuals and
corporations. The law mirrored the 1910 changes regarding disclosure. In
pertinent part, the Act provided that tax returns "shall constitute public
records and be open to inspection as such: Provided, That any and all such
returns shall be open to inspection only upon the order of the President,
under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury and approved by the President."75 The President, however, did

71. 45CONG. REc. 4133 (1910).
72. T.D. 1665, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 117(1910).
73. Id.
74. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing similar provisions
of the Income Tax Act of 1894).
75. Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(d), 38 Stat. 114,177 (1913). The Act
also provided that,
[P]roper officers of any State imposing a general income tax may, upon
the request of the governor thereof, have access to said returns or to an
abstract thereof, showing the name and income of each such
(continued)
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not exercise his authority to provide public inspection of individual tax
returns,76 allowing instead the Progressives in Congress to debate access to
income tax returns during the consideration of subsequent revenue actsP
Progressives argued that publicity would end improper trade policies,
business methods, and conduct, and would further assure fuller and more
accurate reporting by taxpayers.
In 1918, advocates of disclosure nibbled away at the President's
discretionary power by requiring the Commissioner to make available for
public inspection in the offices of every collector, and elsewhere at his
discretion, lists enumerating the names of individuals, but not
corporations, who had filed returns in that district. 78 The law was later
amended to grant to a bona fide shareholder of record, who owned one
percent or more of the outstanding stock of a corporation, the right to
examine the annual income tax returns of such corporation and its
subsidiaries. 7 The law provided, however, that it was a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine not exceeding $1000 or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year for a shareholder to make "known in any manner whatever not
provided by law the amount or source of income, profits, losses,
expenditures, or any particular thereof, set forth or disclosed in any such
corporation ... at such times and in such manner as the Secretary of the

Treasury may prescribe.
Id.

Seligman attributes this provision to LaFollette, the Progressive Senator
from Wisconsin. Seligman's explanation seems reasonable; LaFollette was an
avid supporter of disclosure and Wisconsin was the only state to have an income
tax at this time. See Seligman, supra note 45, at 699.
76. S.REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 844. The 1910 regulations concerning
access to corporate returns, see supra note 72 and accompanying text, were
reformulated. See T.D. 2016, 62 (1914). One difference was that the 1913
regulations allowed a corporation the opportunity to state whether any legitimate
reason existed for refusing permission to the shareholder seeking to inspect the
return.
77. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REc. 7365-74, 7518-19 (1921).
78. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 257, 40 Stat. 1057, 1086.
79. Id. Such shareholders could examine even the returns of years prior to
the time that they became shareholders provided that ownership of one percent
or more of the outstanding stock existed at the time of the request for inspection.
I.T. 1648, I-1 C.B. 186 (1923). Conversely, former shareholders were not allowed to
inspect the return of the corporation for any year. Id. There was no statutory
provision for examining a consolidated return by a stockholder in one of the
subsidiary companies. I.T. 1588, II-1 C.B. 184 (1923). A shareholder's privilege to
inspect was personal and could not be delegated to another. Reg. 74, Art. 424
(1928); Reg. 69, Art. 1093 (1924); Reg. 65, Art. 1094 (1924); Reg 62, Art. 1093 (1922);
Reg. 45, Art. 1093 (1920).
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return."80 Presumably, this provision would be violated if a shareholder
published in a newspaper the amount of tax paid by a corporation. Also,
the regulations were reissued allowing the public the right to inspect
returns of listed or publicly-sold corporations. Further, the Act permitted
any shareholder, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, upon
a proper showing of cause, to inspect the return of his or her corporation. 81.
The right of one percent or more shareholders to examine the income tax
returns of their corporations still exists today, along with the
prohibition on disclosing information obtained. 82
E. The 1924 and 1926 Acts
By 1924, the public disclosure of income tax returns had become a
rallying cry for farm-bloc senators who warned that "secrecy is of the
greatest aid to corruption" and urged that "to-day the price of liberty is
not only eternal vigilence [sic] but also publicity. 83 Forces calling for
disclosure achieved some success in the Revenue Act of 1924, which
required the names of both individuals and corporations filing returns to
be posted, along with, significantly, their tax liabilities. 84 Although
80. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 257, 40 Stat. 1057 (1918).
81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. These regulations were
eliminated in 1920. See T.D. 2961, 22 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 3 (1920).
82. See I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(D)(iii) (1986). In 1921, the LaFollette bloc in
Congress unsuccessfully attempted to change the law to require the publication
of returns, but the bill was defeated in the Senate 28-34. The votes in favor all
came from the farm bloc (Kansas, Washington, Iowa, Oregon, South Dakota,
and Nebraska), joined by LaFollette. The votes in opposition were all
Republicans. Uncle Sam Favors Paul Pry, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 8, 1924, at 353.
After this bill was defeated, LaFollette unsuccessfully tried to make the amount
of income declared by each taxpayer open for inspection. 61 CONG. REc. 7365-74,

7518-19 (1921).
83. MARK HUGH LEFF, THELIMITS OF SYMBOLIc REFORM: THE NEw DEAL AND
TAXATION, 1933-1939, at 67 (1984).
84. Revenue Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 257(b), 43 Stat. 293 (1924), which
provides:
The Commissioner shall as soon as practicable in each year cause to be
prepared and made available to public inspection in such manner as he
may determine, in the office of the collector in each internal-revenue
district and in such other places as he may determine, lists containing
the name and the post-office address of each person making an
income-tax return in such district, together with the amount of the
income tax paid by such person.
Id.
(continued)
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some advocates of disclosure wanted the entire return published,"
questions were raised about whether this would seriously hamper the
routine work of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.8
The 1924 change was supported by Democrats and insurgent
Republicans. 87 Supporters offered two principal arguments: (1) publicity
would discourage tax evasion, promote honesty, and increase revenue; and
(2) publicity would end improper trade policies, business methods, and
conduct. 88 Publicity was bitterly opposed by Secretary of the Treasury
Mellon, Senator Smoot, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, 89 and
Representative Ogden L. Mills, who would later become Secretary of the
Treasury under President Herbert Hoover. They maintained that
publicity had failed to increase revenue in the past, had actually
encouraged tax evasion, and had led to undesirable newspaper
gratification of public curiosity. 90 When President Calvin Coolidge

The House bill permitted public inspection only under rules prescribed by
the Secretary and approved by the President. The Senate bill provided for
complete disclosure. Roy G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAx 245 (1940).
In 1924, the law also expanded state access to federal corporate income tax
returns. '"heproper officers of any State may, upon the request of the governor
thereof, have access to the returns of any corporation, or to an abstract thereof
showing the name and income of the corporation, at such times and in such
manner as the Secretary may prescribe." Revenue Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, §
257(a), 43 Stat. 253 (1924). Previously, such access on the part of state officers was
limited to those states which levied an income tax. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
The 1924 Act was upheld against attacks that it violated an individual's right
to privacy and the right to be secure in his or her personal effects and papers.
Hubbard v. Mellon, 5 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
85. 65 CONG. REc. 2512, 2952-60 (1924). The Progressives apparently did not
view the 1924 Act as a victory but rather a defeat for their position of making
returns open to inspection. 68 CONG. REc. 9403-05, 9078, 9851.
86. Paul Pry Legislation, SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Dec. 20, 1924, at 20.
87.

Paul Pry Legislation, LITERARY DIGEST, Mar. 8, 1924, at 12.

88. S.REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 843.
89. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover issued a statement that the
publicity of returns caused harm to business, especially to the small trader,
because competitors found out too much valuable information.
He
characterized the publicity of returns that existed from 1867 to 1872 as
contributing to the industrial and financial chaos of those times. Id. at 245 n.95.
Presumably, he meant 1867 to 1870; publication was abolished in 1870. See supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
90. RATNER, supra note 16, at 427.
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signed the bill, he issued a statement objecting inter alia to the publicity
provisions.9 1
These provisions apparently raised almost no popular indignation
until tax information was printed in the newspapers a few days before
92
the 1924 election:
Although some newspapers refused to publish this
information, coverage was extraordinarily comprehensive.
Whole pages were devoted to lists of payments by local citizens.
Feature stories reported on the biggest corporate assessments and
the tax payments of prominent out-of-towners like Babe Ruth or
Standard Oil. Teasers told of divorcees who were investigating
their husband's income and wealthy taxpayers who escaped
93
with paltry tax payments.
The New York Times and other newspapers devoted entire pages to
publishing the amount of taxes paid by thousands of persons. 9 4
Enterprising persons published pamphlets containing the names of
taxpayers and the amounts they paid. 95 What is more, the U.S. Supreme
96
Court upheld the right of newspapers to print the lists made public.

The New Republic added a twist in an attempt to defend the
publicity provisions by focusing on the number of person's salaries that
were already public information:
First... are... the [elmployees of cities, counties, states, and
nation-the laborers, street-sweepers, firemen, policemen,
clerks, stenographers, mail-carriers, bookkeepers, teachers,
librarians, scientists, accountants-all those whose salaries are
91.

B LAKEY &BLAKEY, supra note 84, at 246.

92. Income Tax Publicity, THE CURRENT OPINION, Dec. 1924, at 686.
93. LEFF, supra note 83, at 67.
94. See, e.g., Names of Wealthy on Non-Taxable List, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1925, at 1; New York Pays Third of all Income Tax with $500,000,000 on 550,000
Returns; Officials Stress Futility of Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1925, at 1; 1924
Income Tax Payments Decrease; Rockefeller Jr. Leads with $6,277,699; Ford
Payments Total $21,260,023, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1925, at 1.
95. Apparently, a similar book exists in Sweden where the official
assessment lists, showing the amounts of assessable income as determined by
the assessment boards, are public documents. See infra note 165.
96. United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378, 388 (1925) (holding that R.S. § 3167,
making it "unlawful for any person to print or publish in any manner whatever
not provided by law, any income return or any part thereof" did not apply to the
publicity provisions of the 1924 Act); United States v. Baltimore Post, 268 U.S. 388
(1925).
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fixed by public authority and printed in official reports, the
worth of whose work is a regular subject of debate, who must
usually make heroic efforts to exhibit the inadequacy of their
incomes in order to secure tardy increases. Next march the
serried divisions of the employees of private industry who
receive their recompense in wages ....
The hourly or weekly
rates paid ... are published in official documents.... Last of all

march the multitude of farmers who.., cannot count much on
secrecy when the yields and prices of their crops are so obvious.Y
According to the New Republic, the existing law did not go far
enough. The newspaper maintained that very little could be learned
regarding tax evasion or actual incomes from records indicating only the
taxes paid by the individuals. The New Republic contended that the
only logical procedure was to publicize fully the tax returns themselves.
Arguing that the government had gone "far enough to cause irritation to
the taxpayer and the public," the newspaper asserted that it had failed
to go "far enough to reap the substantial benefits of candor.""8
Supporters of the 1924 law declared that it would reveal the illegal
practices of tax evaders, 9 apparently by drawing attention to
suspiciously low payments. The New York Times, however, carried front
page stories stating that income tax collectors felt the publication of
individual tax returns had no appreciable effect on tax administration. 1°0
Yet the Times also published on its front page the names of wealthy and
prominent New Yorkers who paid no income tax, which presumably
would have led to inquiries by the tax administration. 01 Other
editorials attacked the new law as unnecessary, arguing that most
persons are honest and, in any event, the government maintains a large
force of inspectors to check doubtful cases.
By 1924, the anti-disclosure rhetoric was predictable. Disclosure was
criticized as "flagrantly undemocratic, exposing to the general gaze the
affairs of only a small minority. It is petty, furnishing food for the
impudent curiosity of gossips and busybodies. It opens a door to business
fakers, offering them choice lists of moneyed 'prospects."" 02 Newspapers

97. Mrs. Grundy's Taxes, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 12, 1924, at 262.

98. Id. at 263.
99. Income Tax Publicity, supra note 92, at 687.
100. Collectors Assail Law, Majority of Them Report No Increased Revenue
to Government, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 2, 1925, at 1.
101. Cost of Publicity Scored in Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1925, at 1. The
Times suggested that the individuals probably had investments in tax-exempt
securities, "among other factors." Id.
102. Income Tax Publicity, supra note 92, at 687.
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heralded, "[plartners are checking up on each other; husband and wife
are on the fiscal trails of their mates, alimony hunters are running wild,
and 'sucker lists' of the wealthy are being prepared by those who have
something to sell. .

.

. Economically, the new policy will be costly;

morally, it is indefensible; socially, it is deplorable....

103

In his annual message to Congress at the end of 1924, President
Coolidge voiced his opposition to disclosure:
Every one desires a reduction of taxes, and there is a great
preponderance of sentiment in favor of taxation reform. When I
approved the present tax law I stated publicly that I did so in
spite of certain provisions which I believed unwise and harmful.
One of the most glaring of these was the making public of the
amounts assessed against different income tax payers. Although
that damage has now been done, I believe its continuation to be
detrimental to the public welfare and bound to decrease public
revenues so that it ought to be repealed. 1°1
Secretary of the Treasury Mellon expressed a similar sentiment:
Publicity is wholly unnecessary from an administrative
standpoint. Publicity serves one purpose, however. It gives to
business rivals and to those having some ulterior motive
information which is of value to them solely to the extent it is
detrimental to the taxpayer. They gain by the taxpayer being
hurt.
It is difficult to imagine any one thing which would be a
greater spur to the efforts of all taxpayers to avoid a taxable
income than the threat that the amount they paid will be
pilloried. To the direct monetary value of saving payment of an
inherently high tax is added the incentive, in many cases much
stronger, of preserving business privacy.
Immediately upon the recent publication of this information
opened to the public, the newspapers reported a stimulation in
the market for tax-exempt securities. We may promptly expect
renewed use of the many means of tax avoidance, with the

103. Uncle Sam Favors Paul Pry, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 8, 1924, at 353.
104. Cost of Publicity Scored in Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1925, at 1.
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consequent decrease in the productivity of the income tax. The
provision should be repealed." s
Consistent with Secretary Mellon's opposition, Treasury officials
asserted that they were unable to point to a single case in which a tax
dodger had been uncovered as a result of public disclosure. For example,
in 1925, the Treasury reported over 13,000 persons had neglected to file a
tax return-some of whom were bootleggers-and the names of these
persons did not appear on the lists that were published. 10 6 Treasury
officials asserted that public disclosure had not had the effect of
increasing revenue from delinquents; the data made available for
publication were of no particular value; and disclosure was an added
expense to the federal government for which there was no offsetting
benefit. 1°7
In 1926, the vehement opposition of Secretary of the Treasury
Mellon,'08 representatives of big business, 109 and then President Coolidge,
led to a change in the law, requiring the posting only of taxpayer's names
and addresses; not the amount of their liabilities."1 0 This change,
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id.

107. Id. at 1. According to the Treasury, "there is no excuse for the present
publicity provisions except the gratification of idle curiosity and the filling of
newspaper space." Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the House Ways

and Means Comm., 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1925) (hereinafter Hearings].
108. The roots of Mellon's opposition may have been personal. He could not
have been pleased when The New York Times trumpeted that he paid $1,173,987
in income tax, the largest of any individual in the Pittsburgh district. The
subheading of the same article went on to mention that his brother paid $348,646
and a nephew paid $225,834. Andrew W. Mellon Paid $1,173,987 Tax, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1924, at 2.
109. Hearings,supra note 107, at 65-66, 278-79, 280-83.
110. Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 257(e), 44 Stat. 9, 52 ('The Commissioner
shall as soon as practicable in each year cause to be prepared and made
available to public inspection in such manner as he may determine, in the office
of the collector in each internal-revenue district and in such other places as he
may determine, lists containing the name and the post-office address of each
person making an income-tax return in such district.").
As of 1926, the rules governing access by private individuals to non-corporate
returns were as follows: Individual returns were open to inspection by the person
who made the return, their duly constituted attorney in fact, a receiver in
bankruptcy, guardian, or similar legal custodian. I.T. 2087, 111-2 C. B. 328 (1924);
In re Epstein, 300 F. 407 (1924); S. M. 2353, 111-2 C. B. 327 (1924); Reg. 74, Art. 422
(1928). If the maker of the return had died, the administrator, executor, or trustee
of his or her estate was entitled to inspect the return. The Commissioner had the
discretion to open the return to any heir at law or next of kin of a deceased
(continued)
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intended to placate the champions of disclosure,"' essentially remained
the law until 1966.112 According to one commentator, the change
successfully prevented the "spotlight from being thrown in the future on
the hierarchy of wealth which had come to dominate American
society.""1 3 The 1924 publicity provisions and the corresponding concern
about the concentration of wealth motivated Senator Mellon and his
associates "to safeguard their privileged positions by keeping from the
person or to the duly constituted attorney in fact for such person upon a showing
that the heir or kin had a material interest which may be affected by information
contained in the return. Reg. 62, Art. 1090, 8 (c) (1922); Reg. 69, Art. 1090, 8 (b)
(1926); Reg. 74, Art. 421 (1928). Either spouse filing a joint return had the privilege
to inspect it; in the event of the death of either spouse, the inspection privilege
was available to the survivor or the personal representative of the decedent or
duly appointed attorney in fact of the survivor. The Commissioner had the
discretion to allow any heir at law or next of kin of the deceased spouse to inspect
the return upon a showing of a material interest in the return. S.M. 1992, 111-2 C.
B. 327 (1924). Similar rules applied in the case of partnership returns. Any
member of a partnership during any part of the time covered by the return could
inspect it as well as representatives or next of kin of a deceased partner provided
they had a material interest effected by information in the return. Reg. 74, Art.
421 (1928); Reg. 74 Art. 1090 1 7 (1928); Reg. 69 (1926); Reg. 65 (1924); Reg. 62 (1922).
Tax returns filed by or on behalf of an estate were subject to inspection by the
administrator, executor, or trustee of such estate and, in the Commissioner's
discretion, by any heir at law or next of kin of the decedent or by an attorney in
fact for such persons upon evidence of a material interest that may be affected
by information contained in the return. Reg. 74, Art. 421; Reg. Art. 1090, 1 8 (1928);
Reg. 69 (1926); Reg. 65 (1924); Reg. 62 (1922). In the case of trusts, the trustees, any
individual who is a beneficiary of a trust during any part of the time covered by
the return, administrators, executors, representatives ofthe estate of the
deceased beneficiary of the trust or, in the discretion of the Commissioner, any
heir at law or next of kin of such deceased beneficiary, also had access upon a
showing of material interest which may be affected by information contained in
the return. Reg. 74, Art. 421; Reg. 74 art. 1090, 1 9, Reg. 69, Reg. 65 (1924), Reg. 62
(1922). Regulations issued in 1931 expanded access to non-corporate tax returns'
by providing access by persons having a material interest in the taxpayer, for
example, beneficiaries of estates and partners of a partnership. T.D. 4317, 1931-1
C.B. 146.
111. RATNER, supra note 16, at 427.
112. In 1966, the provision was changed to provide information only on
whether a person had filed an income tax return. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, P.L. 89-713, §
4, 80 Stat. 1107, 1109 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988 & Supp. III 1992)).
The change was made because of the difficulty of making microfilm (which was
the medium used to store the data) available to the public and because of the
desire to keep Social Security numbers confidential. S. REP. No. 1625, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7-8 (1966).
113. RATNER, supra note 16, at 427-28.
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public vital facts about the individuals who composed the high income
elite."114

F. The Pink Slip Provisions: 1934-1935
No further changes in the law occurred until 1934. The groundwork
for the 1934 changes was laid by a well publicized scandal involving an
income tax evasion that arose during consideration of the National
Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"). Senator Robert LaFollette, Jr., who
had inherited the cause of income tax disclosure from his father,
declared that the intolerable amount of evasion and understatements of
income that had been uncovered during a Senate investigation would
never have arisen under a system of public disclosure. 115 LaFollette
seized this opportunity by proposing an amendment for full publicity,
which sailed through the Senate on a 56-27 vote. 116 The Conference
Committee, however, which had been informed by Treasury experts that
publicity would be administratively "cumbersome," left the issue of
disclosure once again to the President's discretion." 7 Progressives were
infuriated, and joined en masse with Republicans to sink the NIRA
Conference package." 8
Progressives were keenly aware of the Treasury's opposition to
publicity and were skeptical of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
inclination to use his discretionary power to broaden public access to tax
returns. When the skepticism proved correct, the Senate attached
LaFollette's full publicity amendment to the 1934 Revenue Bill. 19
Although Congress refused to publicize the complete income tax return, it
20
did authorize the so-called pink slip requirements.

114. Id.
115. Quoted in LEFF, supra note 83, at 67-68.
116. Id.
117. Id. LaFollette was chastised for attempting to link the controversial
issue of tax publicity with the NIRA. S. REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 1035 n. 45.
118. Id.
119. 78 CONG. REc. 6554 (1934). LaFollette's proposal was adopted by a 41-34
vote.
120. Revenue Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680, 698 (1934).
Apparently Congressman Wright Patman conceived the idea to use pink slips.
S. REP. No. 266, supra note 22, at 853 n.54. Similar to the earlier votes on
publicizing income tax data, voting on the pink slips was along urban-rural lines.
Except in highly urbanized states, a substantial majority of Democrats and most
Republicans favored publicity. Although only one Northeasterner supported
LaFollette's amendments, Midwestern Senators strongly supported him. The
South split almost evenly because Democratic Party stalwarts opposed the
amendments. LEFF, supra note 83, at 68.
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Each taxpayer was required to fill out a pink slip with his or her
return, containing name and address, total gross income, total deductions,
net income, total credits, and tax liability. These slips were made
available for public inspection.
The pink slip law also applied to
121
corporations and partnerships.
Passed during the depths of the Depression, pink slip supporters
played on the popular resentment toward the rich.122 Advocates thought
121. Publicity for Incomes, NEw REPUBUC, Jan. 22,1936, at 299.
122. The pink slip provision was consistent with the New Deal's concern over
the level of corporate salaries. During the Depression, corporate executives
were viewed by some as an "extraneous, unproductive layer that soaked up an
extravagant share of the shrunken consumer dollar. The widely bruited gap
between a corporation's dispersed ownership and its actual control cast
corporate directors as a specially privileged, self-regulating group that selfishly
hoarded outrageous salaries and bonuses." LEFF, supra note 83, at 74. Themes of
sacrifice, fraud, frugality, and stockholder rights animated discussions over
whether executive salaries should be limited. The compromise was to require
corporations to include with their tax returns a list of names and total
compensation of employees earning more than $15,000. The Treasury submitted
to Congress a cumulative list, which was then made public. Id. at 77. Not
surprisingly, the disclosure of salaries was also controversial:
We are told that because of this publicity these individuals will
become the prey of racketeers, kidnapers and cranks. In considering
the merits of such criticism it is well to bear in mind that in the past, the
wealthy have been, broadly speaking, the only element in the
community exempt from such information. The wages paid to workers
in industry are nearly always a matter of public record. College
professors' salaries are known, and are frequently printed in the
catalogues. Employees of the federal government and of most of the
states and cities receive stipends that are officially recorded. The
American temperament being what it is, the income of almost anyone
can be estimated within broad limits, from the scale on which he lives.
Making public the salaries paid by corporations performs a distinct
public service; for example, the facts can be checked against the wages
paid by the same corporation and against the customary plea of poverty
when the workers ask an increase in those wages. As for the danger from
racketeers and kidnapers, the first point to make is that these gentry do
not need to wait for a government publication to help them select their
potential victims; and in the second place, the answer in the long run is
for the government to fight the underworld directly, and not by
withholding possibly useful data.
Publicity For Incomes, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 1936, at 299.
Opponents of this salary disclosure failed to piggyback repeal of this
provision onto the repeal of the pink slips, but in 1938 they succeeded in
(continued)
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disclosure would deter tax evasion and claimed tax payments by the
wealthy would increase vastly once publicity incited public indignation.
Proponents espoused that "[piublicity is the greatest cure for evils which
may exist in government."12 If someone "knows that his return is a matter
of public record, he will hesitate a long time before he will resort to any
device designed to relieve him of his fair share of the tax."' 24
Supporters presented another rationale for disclosure, maintaining
that "loopholes will be discovered immediately and legislation passed
to correct evasions." 25 Those advocating disclosure doubted the
impartiality of employees of the Internal Revenue Bureau (the
predecessor of the IRS) and argued that disclosure would keep tax
126
administrators honest.
Opposition to the pink slips was fierce and immediate:
A group calling itself the "Sentinels of the Republic"
mobilized the push for repeal before anyone would actually
have to submit the tell-tale pink slips. Its race with the March
15, 1935, filing deadline stirred wide press and popular support,
for this time the question of access to tax returns loomed as a
matter of life and death: The 1932 Lindbergh kidnap gripped the
public consciousness. 127
The Sentinels were successful in laying the foundation for an enormous
taxpayer protest. The group developed special pink slip packets which
furnished the taxpayers with propaganda papers and a petition to mail
to their Congressman. The packet urged its recipients to contact the
Secretary of State, their Congressman, and their local newspapers. As
the Treasury sent out the pink slips and the filing date for income taxes
approached, an avalanche of telegrams and letters, many of them
identical, sent by incensed taxpayers arrived at Congress' doorstep.
Additionally, many people fastened to their pink slips a sticker that
they had obtained from the Sentinels' special packet, declaring, "I
protest against this outrageous invasion of my right of Privacy."' 28 This
orchestrated protest apparently impressed Congressmen, who often

increasing the $15,000 level to $75,000. It was not until 1949, when the Treasury
testified that it considered the extraction of 1,000 names from 600,000 returns a
waste of time, that the salary provision quietly died. LEFF, supra note 83, at 80.
123. 79 CONG. REc. 4511 (1935).
124. 78 CONG. REc. 6553 (1934).
125. Id. at 2600.
126. Id. at 6546.
127. Janssen, supra note 35.
128. LEFF, supra note 83, at 72, 73.

1993]

TURNING THE CLOCK BACK TO THE FUTURE

commented that the majority of the dissension came from "the small
12
taxpayers.' 1
Protesters and supporters of the pink slip system rallied to the cause.
Those who objected to the campaign came out in force, raising the
familiar arguments that the only people who would benefit from the
public disclosure would be business competitors, racketeers, blackmailers,
kidnappers, and those who possessed a malicious sense of curiosity. 130
Dissenters also feared the effect of the pink slips on social harmony as
well as the potential embarrassment, distress, and humiliation that
might be imposed upon the small taxpayer.' 3 The disclosure movement
had been "boiled in the cooking pots of demagogues whose ulterior
motives [had not been] the public interest, but class cleavage and the
32
creation of class hatreds."
Neither side had a monopoly on the hyperbole. Supporters of the
pink slip movement claimed that the opponents of disclosure simply
feared a public display of information showing how well they had fared
under the New Deal. Businessmen, manufacturers and others, the
supporters alleged, had accrued tremendous profits under the New Deal
legislation, and it was they who would lose face by opening their returns
up to the public scrutiny.'33 One supporter of the pink slips, for example,
argued for "pitiless publicity ...thrown upon the incomes of the rich, the
superrich, and the idle rich," especially the 'burglars of wealth, idle
holders of idle capital, lounge lizards of the blue-blooded, and pink-toed
34
aristocracy of wealth."
The pink slip rebellion basically concerned individual returns and
not corporate returns. Even when corporations were specifically
mentioned, it was the "mom and pop" operations:
One of the most serious abuses that will be brought about by
this section is the publication of business information to a man's
competitor, and I am not at this moment thinking of large
business or industry ...but the smaller business men in the cities,

and the small merchants in the towns of the country.' 35

129. 79 CONG. REc. 4506 (1935).
130. See 79 CONG. REc. 4506 (1935); 79 CONG. REc. 2690 (1035); 79 CONG. REC.
2307; LEFF, supra note 83, at 70.
131. 74 CONG. REc. 2691 (1935) (statement of Rep. Bacon).
132. Blow to Recovery Seen in Pink Slips, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1935 at 5.
133. 74 CONG. REc. 3391 (1935).
134. Id. -at 3392-93.
135. RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY, supra note 15, at 84 (speech of Mr. Bacon).
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Representative Bacon wrote in a letter to the Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means: "I do not think I need to give a
summation of the reasons in opposition to the 'pink slip' section.
However, I will say that most of the complaints I have received have
been from people of modest means, small business men and the salaried or
wage classes.' 1 36 The House Ways and Means Committee Report 37 on the
question of repealing the disclosure feature referred to the previous
unsuccessful attempts at publicity without differentiating between the
corporate and individual returns, or between big and small businesses.
Instead the report focused almost solely on individuals.
The uproar over the pink slip provisions led to their repeal in 1935
before ever taking legal effect. 38 The House Report recommending repeal
argued that disclosure was unnecessary:
[Aimple authority is contained in other sections of existing law
authorizing the inspection of income-tax returns by the
committees of Congress charged with the responsibility of
levying taxation ... [Plublication ... will be of slight benefit to

the Treasury in the prevention of tax evasion, which is the main
argument advanced for such publicity. The real remedy

. . .

is

careful auditing
of returns and the swift imposing of penalties for
139
such evasion.

In addition, Congress cited unfavorably the experience of Wisconsin,
the only state that had a disclosure law at that time.140 The House
Report quoted from a report by the Wisconsin Tax Commission which
stated that the disclosure provisions had been introduced in 1923 but that
none of the asserted benefits had yet materialized. According to the
Wisconsin report, the published returns were used by credit companies,
136. Letter from Representative Bacon to the Chairman of the House Ways
& Means Committee (Feb. 14, 1935), quoted in RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY, supra
note 15, at 62.
137.

REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 6359, REPEAL

CERTAIN PROVISIONS RELATING TO PUBLICITY OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS OF INCOME,

H.R. REP. No. 313,74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
138. Act of Apr. 19, 1935, ch. 74, 49 Stat. 158 (1935). The Saturday Evening Post
described the repeal as scrapping "what promised to be a card-index system
available to every kidnaper, blackmailer, blue-sky security salesmen, town
gossip, gold digger, alimony hunter or other exploiter on the prowl for victims."
The Pink-Slip Strike As Told by Raymond Pitcairn,SATURDAY EVENING POST, June

8, 1935, at 23.
139. H. R. REP. No. 313, supra note 137, at 1.
140. LaFollette is given credit for Wisconsin's law by Uncle Sam Favors Paul
Pry, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 8, 1924, at 353.
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4
salespersons, and business competitors to annoy and harass taxpayers. '
The Wisconsin report indicated that disclosure had not resulted in the
discovery of unreported income and claimed that it had actually led to
more filing of incorrect returns. No explanation was provided why the
if they did, why
number of incorrect returns should have increased or 42
that increase should have been attributed to disclosure.
The repeal of the pink slip provisions could be explained in part by
Congressional self-interest. One Congressman, recalling the country's
earlier experience with disclosure, reminded his colleagues that, "when

the first income-tax payments were made public . . . the names of the
1 43
Congressmen were the first ones most eagerly published and scanned."

One commentator gave credit for the repeal to the ability of the antipublicity forces to characterize themselves as defending the middleclass. Opponents of the pink slip movement would, for example,
emphasize how embarrassed an unsuccessful businessmen would be at
seeing his or her business affairs laid out on the local front page. The
specter was raised of creditors cutting off the flow of funds. The Sentinels
of the Republic also used small-business imagery that obscured their
dependence on wealthy conservatives.'"
Although the sentiment against the pink slips was strong, repeal of
disclosure was not a sure thing. As late as February 1935, there was
actually very little hope for repeal.145 Subsequently, the repeal forces
quickly and effectively began to assemble a formidable coalition of
merchants' associations, chambers of commerce, and other business groups.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue and other Treasury officials also
supported repeal. Although Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
refused to endorse repeal, the Treasury was anything but neutral. In
addition, Roosevelt's apparent caution, conservatism, and drift in early
1935 made the disclosure law vulnerable.' 46 As the tide turned in favor of
repeal, a last-ditch amendment in the House to confine publicity to
people earning over $25,000 a year was easily defeated. 47 Remarkably,
only one month after the pundits had discounted the chances of repeal, it
swept through Congress.'"
141. H. R. REP. No. 313, supra note 137, at 2.
142. Id.
143. 83 CONG. REC. 3058 (1938) (statement of Rep. Gifford).
144. LEFF, supra note 83, at 72.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 74CONG. REC. 2305 (1935).
148. The vote in the House was 301-99. Republicans, who by 1935 enjoyed
extraordinary cohesion, voted almost unanimously for repeal. All third-party
Congressmen voted for disclosure, but "rural Democrats split slightly against it
and Southern Democrats-whose innate conservatism often surfaced when
(continued)
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The pink slip proposal was the last time Congress debated the issue
of access to tax information by the general public. 149 Similar to most of
the earlier debates, the focus was on individuals and to a lesser extent, on
small corporations. The lobbying effort (as exemplified by the Sentinels
of the Republic), the appeal made to the public (invoking the fear of
kidnapping, criminal extortion, constant solicitation), the pressure put on
Congress (as Representative Bacon put it, coming mostly from those of
"modest means"), the House Report, and the debate in Congress, all
centered on the concerns of individuals and of small corporations. No
attempt was made to distinguish those concerns from those of publiclytraded corporations.
The 1910 law remained in effect until 1976. Federal law delegated
the authority to the Executive branch to open tax returns for inspection
upon order of the President and under rules prescribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury and approved by the President. Debate over this provision
shifted to governmental access to tax returns by agencies other than the
IRS. This debate was marked by a dizzying sequence of policy flips and
turns, 10 with unelected administrators in the Executive branch exercising
enormous power. "[Tihe story is one of the exercise of discretion granted
by a Congress unwilling to define precisely the policy to be followed,"''5
concluded a 1975 report to the Senate. The Tax Reform Act of 1976152
ended the Executive branch's discretion. In the aftermath of the abuses
of Watergate, 5 3 Congress announced the general rule that "Irleturns and
party loyalty was not involved"-voted for repeal by a margin of almost two to
one. LEFF, supra note 83, at 72; 74 CONG. REC. 2305 (1935). The division in the
Senate was somewhat similar, except that Republicans from farm states divided
evenly. No Northeasterners voted against repeal, which is not surprising
because none had voted in favor of the pink slips. More striking was the erosion
of support from rural conservative Democrats.
149. Access to tax returns by the non-public continued to absorb the
attention of Congress. In 1936, for example, Congress permitted the inspection
of individual, in addition to corporate income tax returns, by state and local tax
administrators. Tax Act of 1936, Subtitle A, ch. 1, pt. V, § 55 (b)(1), 49 Stat. 158; see
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1). Previously, only corporate returns were available for
inspection.
150. For an excellent history on the various administrative guidelines on
disclosure, see S. REP.No. 266, supra note 22, at 844-53.
151. Id. at 849.
152. 90 Stat. 1525 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
153. .See Who's Snooping Into Your Tax Returns Now?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 11, 1975, at 61; see also Confidentiality of Tax Return Information:
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d.
Sess. (1976) [hereinafter Confidentiality Hearings]; I.R.S. Procedures: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and
(continued)
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return information shall be confidential,"'s 4
authorized.

except as otherwise

G. Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosure: 1933-Present
In the late 1920's and early 1930's, increasing attention was focused on
the financial reporting practices of large corporations. In a series of
articles in the Atlantic Monthly and then in his influential book, Main
Street and Wall Street, Harvard economist William Z. Ripley accused
large corporations of deceptive and misleading financial reporting. 55
Following the stock market crash of 1929, which led to an "outcry for full
disclosure in all matters corporate and financial,"'1 6 the American
Institute of Accountants and the New York Stock Exchange began working
together to improve corporate financial reporting. In 1933, the New York
Stock Exchange for the first time threatened a listed company, with delisting unless it improved its financial disclosures. 5 7 In the same year,
the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted, 5 8 which required "full and fair
disclosure" in the prospectuses that accompany the interstate issuance of
securities. 159 This was immediately followed by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,160 which created the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") to administer both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The 1934 Act also
required the filing of periodic reports by companies whose securities were
listed on the national exchanges.

Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter Procedures Hearings];Freedom
of Information: IRS: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974);

I.R.C. § 6103 (Supp. 1990).

154. I.R.C., § 6103(a) (1986). The 1976 changes continued prior law, see supra
note 79 and accompanying text, which permits any bona fide shareholder of
record owning one percent or more of the outstanding stock of a corporation to
inspect the return of such corporation or its subsidiary. 26 U.S.C. §
6103(e)(1)(D)(iii) (1986). A shareholder "shall not disclose any return or return
information obtained by him ..." Id. § 6103(a)(3).
155. Stephen A. Zeff, 1926 to 1971 Chronology of Significant Developments in
the Establishment of Accounting Principles in the United States, in RAPPAPORT
AND R EvsNE,CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: THE ISSUES, THE OBJECTIVES AND
SOME NEW PROPOSALS 219 (1972).
156. Robert Lewis Shayon, Disenchantment, SATURDAY REv., Apr. 13, 1963, at

76.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Zeff, supra note 155, at 220.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
Zeff, supra note 155, at 220.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1988).
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One of the SEC's primary functions was to regulate disclosure and
measurement standards,16' based largely upon the belief that the
securities markets' failure of the 1930's resulted from inadequate
disclosure and an excessive number of measurement methods used by
public companies.1 62 For this reason, the Securities Act of 1933 is often
63
referred to as the "truth in securities law."'
The SEC has through the years mandated extensive disclosure of
income tax data both through its own regulations on this issue and by its
requirement that SEC-regulated corporations must follow generally
accepted accounting practices ("GAAP"), as established. by the
appropriate accounting bodies.'" Other countries have adopted similar
rules.' 65
161.

Measurement standards refer to the methods by which assets,

liabilities, ownership and profit and loss are disclosed.

BERTRAND HORWITZ &

RICHARD K. KOLODNY, FINANCIAL REPORTING RULES AND CORPORATE DECISIONS:

A

STUDY OF P UBUC POLICY 10 (1982).

162. Id. at 10.
163. Id.
164. In 1938, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release ("ASR") 4, in which it
stated that financial statements filed pursuant to its rules and regulations that
were prepared in accordance with accounting practices for which there was no
substantial authoritative support were presumed to be misleading, and that
footnotes or other disclosures would not rebut this presumption. The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), formerly the American
Institute of Accountants ("AIA"), established a Committee on Accounting
Procedure ("CAP"), which began to issue accounting research bulletins in 1939.
The authority of these bulletins was ambiguous because the CAP stated that the
force of its opinions "rested upon their general acceptability." HORWITZ &
KOLODNY, supra note 161, at 11, 12.

The progress of the CAP was disappointingly slow and the AICPA then
established the Accounting Principles Board ("APB") in 1959. The APB was
supposed to formulate GAAP. The APB, however, was also criticized for its
slowness, as well as for the poor quality of its opinions. The credibility of the APB
was weakened at an early stage in its history when the SEC refused to accept one
of its opinions and forced the Board to reverse itself. Id. at 12, 13. As a result, the
APB was replaced with the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") in
1973. The FASB received a vote of confidence from the SEC in the same year in
ASR 150. In ASR 150, the SEC stated that the principles, standards and practices
promulgated by the FASB in its Statements and Interpretations will be
considered as having substantial authoritative support, and contrary practices
will be considered to have no such support. Id. at 13, 14. As the SEC said seven
years later in ASR 280, "while there is, of course, always the possibility that the
Commission may conclude it cannot accept an FASB standard in a particular
area, such events have been rare." ASR 280 at 9.
165. All of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
("OECD") countries (the Western democracies and Japan), and many other
(continued)
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industrial and industrializing nations, have financial disclosure requirements as
part of SEC-type regulatory frameworks. Such countries also have their own
versions of generally accepted accounting principles as well as authoritative
standard setting bodies such as FASB in the United States.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the Stock Exchange plays an extremely
important role with respect to disclosure requirements. France (Commission des
Operations de Bourse), Italy (Commission Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa)
and Mexico (Comision Nacional de Valores) have a national commission, similar
to the U.S. format, that enforces their securities laws. Japan has a Securities
Bureau. In Canada, each province and territory has its own securities laws
enforced by a local administrator. Australia has a National Companies and
Securities Commission. In the Netherlands and Germany the stock exchanges
are almost the exclusive source of securities regulation. HAROLD BLOOMENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.08[3] (1982). For
a detailed description of the elaborate Japanese rules, see Louis Loss ET AL,
JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION (1983). Corporations are required to disclose a
variety of financial data in these countries. For a description of the disclosure
rules in various countries, see BLOOMENTHAL, supra. In 1988, the OECD set forth
a list of financial information, including income taxes, that should be disclosed in
the published reports of multinational enterprises. OECD, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION: CLARIFICATION OF THE OECD
GUIDELINES (1988). Financial reporting requirements, including the disclosure of
income tax expenses, are also being examined on a comparative, cross national
basis by two other important international organizations: the International
Accounting Standards Committee and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions.
In addition to the disclosure of income tax information resulting from
securities laws and accounting standards, several countries have additional
forms of disclosure related to their customs and traditions. In Japan, for
example, the national government publishes lists of companies that pay the
largest amounts of taxes. Apparently most major firms want to be mentioned.
Pressure to Reduce U.S. Budget Deficit Seen Working Against Foreign Tax
Credits, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 225, at G-3 (Nov. 24, 1987).
Under the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act, the amount of corporate
income taxes paid is a matter of public record, available for public examination
at the tax administration. Telephone interview with Lars Hollner, Swedish
Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17, 1993). Since 1914, the Taxeringskalender, a
private publication, lists gross and taxable income for every Swedish citizen who
qualifies. In 1985, for example, the edition for the Stockholm area included every
individual who made more than $15,000 a year and every couple who made
$20,000 or more. FORBES, Feb. 25, 1985, at 130. (The Forbes article does not clarify
whether the amounts refer to gross income or taxable income.) Anybody with
$63,000 or more in assets also made the list. In 1975, the publishers of
Taxeringskalender started breaking down the list on a county-by-county basis,
like telephone directories. Id. "It turns out the Swedes are such busybodies that
the government doesn't need to offer a bounty for ratting on delinquent
taxpayers, as the IRS does. In Sweden this happens anyway. Says a Swedish
(continued)
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Taxes have been included as a significant item of expense in the
financial statements of most large corporations, at least since the postDepression era. There has long been a consensus that income taxes should
be disclosed. More controversial has been the treatment of interperiod
allocations; that is, how to treat the tax implications of differences in
the timing of the recognition of income for book and tax purposes.
Although these technical rules have continued to be refined, neither the
SEC nor the authoritative accounting standards bodies have ever found
the arguments against disclosure of income taxes persuasive.
In 1973, the SEC adopted the current rules on the disclosure of income
taxes. 166 The 1973 arguments made by opponents of the SEC's position
were similar to those that have been raised during the current debates
regarding state-level disclosure, and thus merit mention. In response to
comments that the 1973 proposals would violate the confidentiality of
federal income tax information and provide valuable data to
competitors, the SEC observed that the full and fair disclosure of
material information is a basic part of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Act of 1934. Each Act provides that registration statements
must contain, in addition to other information specified, such information
"as the Commission may by rules or regulations require, as necessary or
167
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
The SEC believed that its 1973 rules were consistent with this authority.
The SEC also noted that opponents did not provide any specific examples
of how the detailed reporting of income taxes would help competitors. In
any event, it concluded that the needs of present and potential investors
were best served by providing such information, notwithstanding the
possibility of an increased risk of adverse consequences at the hands of
competitors.
The 1973 changes, requiring detailed information on federal income
taxes and aggregate data on state income taxes, is part of a panoply of
financial data that the SEC requires to be disclosed. Such information is
presented on Form 10-K, which publicly-traded corporations must
annually file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 168 The 10official, 'Sometimes a jealous neighbor will call tax officials and say, Please look
into my neighbor, who has just bought a new Mercedes-Benz.' They call that the
royal Swedish envy." Id.
Tax liabilities are also public information in Norway and are published by
the newspapers. Telephone interview with the Finance Officer, Norwegian
Embassy (Nov. 2,1993).
166. Accounting Series Release 149 (Nov. 28, 1973). For a detailed
description, see infra note 272 and accompanying text.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1) (1988).
168. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1856-57 (1990). For
detailed background information, see BNA, ANNUAL REPORTING UNDER THE
(continued)
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169

K must be sent to stockholders of record or beneficial owners on request
without charge. 170 Some corporations also make it available to the
public on request. It is also accessible on the SEC's electronic data
gathering analysis and retrieval system ("EDGAR"), as well as through
commonly used computer data bases such as LEXIS and Compustat.
7
EDGAR will soon be available on Internet. 1
H. Citizens for Tax Justice and the Use of SEC-Required Disclosure for
Policy Analysis

Working with SEC Forms 10-K, annual reports, and related
information, Citizens for Tax Justice ("CTJ") was able to compare the
amount of federal income taxes paid by many of the nation's largest
corporations with the amount of their income.

72

Through a series of

LAWS (1987 & 1992 Supp.); Alan K. Austin, Preparationof the
Annual Report on Form 10-K, in SECURITIES FILINGS: 1992 REvIEW AND UPDATE
FEDERAL SECURITIES

(1992); DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., SEC FINANCIAL REPORTING: ANNUALREPORTS
TO SHAREHOLDERS FORM 10-K (1981).

169. The official designation is "Form 10-K, annual report pursuant to
sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934." 17 C.F.R. §
249.310 (1982).
170. SEC Rule 14a-3(b)(9). Corporations are required to file numerous other
reports with the SEC. See Loss & Seligman, supra note 168, at 1854-1916.
171. On Line, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 3, 1993, at A21.
Form 10-K consists of four general parts, only one of which deals with federal
income taxes. The first 'part compels detailed disclosures relating to business,
properties, legal proceedings and submission of matters to a vote of security
holders. The second part consists of market price data for the company's
common stock, a summary of financial data appropriate for trend analysis, three
years of audited financial statements and management's discussion and analysis
of the issuer's financial condition. The third part consists of the traditional proxy
disclosure information relating to directors and executive officers, executive
compensation, beneficial ownership of securities and certain relationships and
related transactions. The fourth section contains required financial statements.
Regulation S-X governs the form and content (not the accounting standards)
of financial statements. This regulation was first adopted in the 1940's. The most
recent general revision occurred in 1980. Between 1937 and 1982, the SEC
published 307 Accounting Series Releases. The more important releases were
codified in Codification of Fin. Rep. Policies, 6 Fed. L. Rep. (CCH) 72, 901. Since
1975, the SEC has published Staff Accounting Bulletins.
172. This description of CTJs work is based on the following CTJ publications
and reports: CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, IT'S WORKING, BUT... (1989); CITIZENS FOR
TAX JUSTICE, THE CORPORATE TAX COMEBACK (1988); CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, 130
REASONS WHY WE NEED TAX REFORM (1986); CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, MONEY
FOR NOTHING (1986) [hereinafter MONEY FOR NOTHING]; CITIZENS FOR TAX
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reports in the 1980s, CTJ was able to demonstrate that many of the most
profitable corporations in the United States were paying little or no
corporate income tax. Incredibly, some companies were receiving
subsidies from the federal government in the form of tax rebates while
making billions of dollars in profits. Thus, some companies actually had
negative tax rates.
CTJ found that the federal corporate income tax policies of the early
1980's-intended to stimulate investment-had become a device for
corporations to "shelter" income in misplaced investments and
considerably reduce or eliminate their tax liability. In fact, in a report
issued just before the 1986 Tax Reform Act, CTJ found that more than half
of the 250 most profitable corporations in the United States that had
been surveyed enjoyed at least one federal tax-free year between 1981 and
1985.
For example, CTJ found that Boeing corporation made close to $3
billion in profits from 1981 to 1985 and received rebates totaling more
than $245 million from the government, a net tax rate over those years of
negative 8.3 percent. Likewise, the federal government gave Dow
Chemical Corporation rebates over that period totaling $200 million on
$771 million in profits, a negative 25.9 percent rate.
Many of the provisions that gave these companies such large tax
benefits had been adopted in the name of economic growth. But a
detailed analysis of forty-one companies that paid no federal income tax
at all from 1981 to 1984 found that they reduced their aggregate capital
spending by four percent and cut their total number of employees by six
percent over the same period. Yet these corporations received those huge
tax breaks ostensibly to encourage growth in capital spending and job
creation. In contrast, forty-three of the highest-taxed companies in CTJ's
1981-84 analysis boosted their capital spending by twenty-one percent
73
and incurred a four percent growth in their workforce.1
Another flaw in the federal corporate income tax revealed by CTJ
was the unequal treatment of direct competitors. A 1984 study, for
example, revealed that General Electric obtained $283 million in tax
rebates while earning profits of $6.5 billion in 1981-83. At the other end
of the spectrum, one of the highest taxed corporations in the survey also
was a major manufacturer of appliances, Whirlpool, which paid 45.6
percent of its profits in federal income taxes. Thus, direct competitors
had very different after-tax rates of return because of the tax code.
The publication of this type of information by CTJ had a staggering
impact. Although information on the aggregate decline and disparities
JUSTICE, CORPORATE TAXPAYERS & CORPORATE FREELOADERS (1985); CrIZENS FOR

TAX JUSTICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAXES IN THE REAGANYEARs (1984).
173. MONEY FOR NOTHING, supra note 172, at 3.
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in federal corporate income taxes had been available previously, none of
it had the force of CTJ's documentation. When the CTJ studies were
published, both conservatives and liberals were outraged. Conservative
columnist James Kilpatrick, for example, complained to Senator Robert
Byrd on national television about corporate welfare. He noted that a
mother of three, who earned $12,000 a year, paid more in taxes than
Boeing, General Electric ("GE"), DuPont, and Texaco, combined.
Largely because of this public outrage, and the very real policy
problems exposed by CTJ's work, federal tax reform in 1986 included a
strengthened alternative minimum tax. Other significant changes
repealed the investment tax credit, tightened the "completed contract
accounting rules" that had eliminated taxes for defense contractors, and
restricted other corporate tax shelters. Because of the added revenue
from these changes, Congress and the President were able to reduce the
top corporate income tax rate from forty-six percent to thirty-four percent
and still increase the revenue from the corporate income tax
substantially.
By 1988, only seven of the 250 corporations that CTJ had earlier
surveyed were now able to avoid federal income taxes entirely. Only
forty-five companies were able to bring their effective tax rate below ten
percent. In contrast, 113 of these same companies had paid less than ten
percent of their profits in taxes over the full 1981-1985 period. All but
two of the forty-one corporations that paid no tax at all over the 1981 to
1985 period were forced to pay at least some federal income tax in 1988.
The combined tax rate for these forty-one companies, which was a
negative 4.3 percent from 1981 to 1985, increased to 27.9 percent of their
profits in 1988. In addition, tax reform brought a more level playing field
for GE and Whirlpool. In 1988, GE paid twenty-one percent of its profits
in taxes; Whirlpool paid twenty-seven percent. The gap between their
effective tax rates narrowed from fifty percentage points to only six.
Although opponents of tax reform argued that business investment
would decline as a result of changes in the corporate tax structure and
predicted imminent economic collapse, just the opposite occurred.
Actually, business investment surged strongly. Real business investment
in industrial equipment, which rose by a minuscule 0.1 percent annually
from 1981 to 1986 (the years when corporate incentives for investment
were greatest), increased by an annual 4.0 percent during the three years
following the 1986 changes. From 1986 to 1989, real business fixed
investment grew at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, appreciably more than
the 1.9 percent rate of growth over the previous five years.
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I. Summary
Since the repeal of the pink slip provisions in 1934, Congress has not
revisited the issue of public access to federal tax returns. The semihysterical atmosphere in which the pink slips were debated proved to be
the death knell for public access to both individual and corporate tax
returns. In a sense, subsequent events have reduced the need for public
access to federal corporate income tax returns. The SEC has essentially
preempted the issue by mandating the disclosure of extensive data by
publicly-traded corporations) 74 Because of the cornucopia of data
already available in the public domain, it is easy to see why no further
debate at the federal level about public access to corporate returns has
occurred. The nation's increased concern for individuals' rights to privacy
also makes it easy to understand why no post-1934 debate over access to
individual tax returns has taken place. In 1993, it is unthinkable for
proposals like the pink slip returns for individuals to be taken
seriously. 175
The history of disclosure at the federal level indicates that, on the
occasions when Congress focused on the differences between corporations
and individuals, it tended to opt for more disclosure in the case of
corporations. Even today, the fact that a one-percent shareholder can
inspect the tax return of his or her corporation (although a shareholder
cannot disclose anything obtained from the inspection), 7 6 indicates that
corporations are treated as having less legitimate claims to privacy than
individuals. 77 What is surprising from a review of the history of the
federal debate is the inordinate amount of attention that the
Progressives placed on obtaining the income tax returns of individuals to
the neglect of corporations. If the Progressives and other supporters of
disclosure had more carefully distinguished between corporations and
individuals and proposed separate and independent laws governing
access to the tax returns of each, they might have been more successful in
protecting the victory they won in 1924 and perhaps salvaged the pink
slip system for corporations. No one apparently on either side of the
debate went to great lengths to differentiate the issues involved in
174.
175.
returns
Behind

See supra part G.
For a limited proposal, however, calling for the disclosure of the tax
of millionaires, see Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost for Millionaires: Peeking
the Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U.

REv. OFL. & SOC. CHANGE 951 (1991).

176. This same provision exists in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 3055 (1989); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 33, § 822 (1992).
177. See infra parts III.F.; IV.A.

See
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corporate disclosure from that of access to individual returns. Having
chosen to pitch their battle over access to individual returns, supporters
of disclosure gave up an opportunity to achieve corporate disclosure. But
as was seen above, Senator LaFollette and the Progressives, as well as
other early advocates of disclosure, were eventually vindicated over the
last sixty years by the SEC's actions.
The CTJ's use of SEC-mandated disclosure to transform the
inaccessible and arcane world of corporate taxation into a cornerstone of
the 1986 Tax Reform Act has not been lost on state tax reformers. With
the SEC effectively resolving the issue of federal tax disclosure, debate
has shifted to the state level and to the disclosure of state corporate
income taxes. This debate has been fueled by revelations that large
numbers of profitable corporations pay only a minimum state income tax.
For example, until New York's major corporate tax reform in the late
1980's, many of that State's largest and most profitable corporationssome having New York sales in excess of $1 billion and New York
property in excess of $2 billion-paid the minimum $250 tax. 178 These
statistics have led to efforts to learn more about the workings of state
corporate income taxes, but these attempts have been stymied by the
inability to correlate data with specific corporations.
II. DISCLOSURE AT THE STATE LEVEL
Effective use of the federal disclosure laws in the mid-1980's
motivated state legislators and tax reformers to consider similar laws at
the state level. Their interest was heightened by increasing concern
about state budget shortfalls, brought about by a number of factors,
including reductions in federal aid, the recession, and statutorilymandated limitations on revenue-raising at the local or state levels. In
addition, several states adopted an array of corporate tax credits and
other tax incentives in an effort to stimulate their recession-plagued
economies.
In light of the need for new revenues, questions were raised about
whether corporations were paying their "fair share" of the cost of public
services. Specifically, the adoption of new corporate tax incentives in
the face of looming deficits raised serious concerns about whether these
expenditures were achieving their intended goals. It soon became obvious
that none of these questions could be answered without more information
about how much particular, large businesses were paying in state taxes.
At the state level, only Wisconsin has had a long history of income
tax disclosure. Until recently, its law went unnoticed by other states.
178. Richard D. Pomp, Reforming a State Corporate Income Tax, 51 ALB. L.
REv. 375, 635 (1987).
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Perhaps this neglect was understandable because only lately have
Wisconsin tax reformers used the disclosure law effectively. Three other
states have adopted disclosure laws within the past few years,
Massachusetts being the most controversial. This portion of the article
reviews these experiences with disclosure.

A. Massachusetts
In 1992, due to the efforts of the Tax Equity Alliance for
Massachusetts ("TEAM"), Massachusetts voters approved a ballot
question calling for extensive corporate tax disclosure. The law applied
to all publicly-traded corporations, all banks, and virtually all insurance
companies, doing business in Massachusetts. These corporations were
required to file annual reports with the Secretary of State, listing
specific items from their state excise (income) tax returns, which would
upon request be available for public inspection.
The ballot question called for disclosure of a panoply of
information. 79 A company could request permission to attach additional
information. Entities filing a consolidated return had to list all the
entities that were consolidated.'8 0
A coalition of business groups aggressively opposed the ballot
question. Two months before successful passage of the ballot question,
TEAM, the business community, and legislative leaders reached a
political compromise and agreed to adopt a less extensive form of
disclosure that would take effect at the end of 1993, regardless of the
outcome of the ballot vote.' This compromise was adopted by the

179. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 62C, § 12A (1992). Among the data designated for
disclosure are: gross profit; taxable Massachusetts tangible property; taxable net
worth; gross receipts or sales; net income; total net taxable income; income
subject to apportionment; income taxable in Massachusetts; total net and gross
direct premiums in or allocable to Massachusetts; taxable premiums; gross
investment income; Massachusetts taxable investment income; net underwriting
profit; admitted assets; total adjusted taxable income; each deduction,
exemption, credit, offset, adjustment, or credit to carry over that reduces income
subject to taxation or otherwise affects tax liability; the percentage used, if any, to
establish what portion of total net taxable income is apportioned to
Massachusetts; total Massachusetts excise or tax due; any excess tax credits or
credits subject to carryover to future years; and net income according to a
company's books on its federal return.
180. Id.
181. The compromise was intended to avoid a "divisive confrontation" that
"would inflict severe, long-run damage." MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL COMMISSION
ON BUSINESS TAX POLICY, MAJORITY REPORT 5 (1993) [hereinafter MAJORITY
REPORT].
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legislature and signed by Governor Weld. As part of this compromise, a
Special Commission on Business Tax Policy was created to study
Massachusetts business taxes. 182

182. The Commission was charged inter alia with the responsibility of
"making an investigation and study relative to the business tax policy of
[Massachusetts] including, but not limited to, business tax disclosure ... in the
context of the goals of equity, neutrality, simplicity, tax competitiveness,
confidentiality, and the public's right to know." Act of 1992, ch. 218, § 3. As part of
that study, a report on disclosure was prepared by the staff of the Commission.
See MASSACHUSETTS

SPECIAL COMMISSION ON BUSINESS TAX POLICY, CORPORATE
GOOD OR BAD FOR THE COMMONWEALTH?, DRAFT WORKING
[hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT]; see also Robert P.

TAX DISCLOSURE:

PAPER (1993)
Strauss, State Disclosure of Tax Return Information: Taxpayer Privacy vrs. The
Public's Right to Know, July 1, 1993.
The Staff of the Commission also issued a paper concluding that the
Massachusetts tax structure was relatively neutral and equitable. See YOLANDA
K. KODRZYCKI, MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON B USINESS TAX POLICY,
CORPORATE TAXATION IN MASSACHUSETTS: How LEVEL IS THE P LAYING FIELD? This

issue is independent of the disclosure issue; nonetheless, there was an attempt to
confuse the two by opponents of disclosure. They argued, based on the Staffs
paper, that disclosure was not needed because there were no major problems
with the State's tax structure. See Michael Zuckoff, State Tax System: No
Roadblock, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1993, at 21. The Commission's Majority Report
also cited that study for the proposition that "the corporate excise tax is
reasonably equitable and neutral," which it then used as further evidence against
disclosure. See MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 181, at 10. The actual study,
however, conceded, that "state and federal laws prohibit members of the public
from seeing tax returns or any tax return data that could lead to identification of
specific taxpayers. Therefore, this study cannot address whether a particular
corporation paid its 'fair share' of taxes." MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra, at
2
The study was strongly criticized by supporters of disclosure on numerous
grounds. The study's conclusion that most of the companies that paid the
minimum tax had low profits was attacked because the report was based on
1990-a recession year when many companies paying the minimum tax may
have legitimately had low profits. The more relevant question is whether
companies with large profits paid low state taxes, similar to the situation that
existed at the federal level prior to 1986.
The study was also attacked for using a defective measure of profits, and for
basing one of its effective tax rate calculations on taxable income after
apportionment, which ignores defects or weaknesses in the apportionment
factor. Because the report worked with aggregate data based on a sample,
another problem was the inability to identify outliers. By using aggregates, any
skewed distribution of credits could not be easily identified. In addition, the
sample included corporations with the 250 largest tax bills, not corporations that
were "large" using some other criteria (e.g., sales, payroll, property, book income,
(continued)
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Although the same taxpayers are subject to the law that was
actually enacted, the amount of information subject to disclosure was
reduced. Specifically, businesses are currently required to disclose the
following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

name;
address of principal office;
Massachusetts taxable income;
total Massachusetts excise tax due;
non-income excise tax due;
gross receipts or sales;
either gross profit or credit carry overs to future years;
income subject to apportionment)"

Corporations filing a combined return must report the names and
addresses of all the corporations that are combined. The Secretary of
State must make available a list of all taxpayers that are subject to
disclosure. The first reports under this law are due December 31, 1993,
based on the taxpayer's most recently filed Massachusetts tax return.
The enacted bill continues to afford corporations covered by the
disclosure requirement with the opportunity to give the Secretary of
State additional information as part of their annual disclosure reports.
This provision was included to provide corporations with an opportunity
to provide a fuller understanding of the financial and tax information
being disclosed.' 8 The Secretary of State must make all of the above
information available for public inspection.
Under the Massachusetts law, the Commissioner of Revenue is
required to publish an aggregate statistical report of the taxes collected
from corporations and other businesses, as well as many of the claimed
tax credits, deductions, exemptions, and exclusions. The report must
disaggregate data by industry and categories of firm size."5

etc.). Finally, the sample included no insurance companies. See Memorandum
from Citizens for Tax Justice to the Massachusetts Special Commission on
Business Tax Policy (June 27, 1993); Memorandum from Robert Tannenwald,
Research Director, to the Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax
Policy (June 14, 1993) (enclosing additional memoranda, including one from the
author of the study on whether the playing field is level in Massachusetts).
183. M ASS. GEN. L. ch. 62C, § 83(c) (1992). If the amount of any of the items
changes, the taxpayer must file an amended report within 30 days. § 83CW). The
items covered are slightly different in the case of banks and insurance
companies.
184. MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at 5.
185. M Ass. GEN. L. ch. 62C, § 82 (1992).
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Notwithstanding the political compromise that led to the reduced
disclosure provisions, more changes may still occur. In July, 1993, the
Special Commission on Business Tax Policy voted to recommend
legislation that would replace the existing tax disclosure law with a
system of coded disclosure under which corporations would be identified
only by a number. It was further recommended that the coded disclosure
indicate the amount of tax credits claimed by a corporation. Finally, it
was recommended that each corporate filer not part of a combined return
should enter on its tax disclosure report a numerical code186indicating the
multicorporate entity, if any, with which it is affiliated.
In a controversial parliamentary procedure of dubious legality,' 87 the
Massachusetts Senate adopted a version of the Majority Report.188 In a
significant deviation from the Majority Report, however, the Senate bill
provided that the number assigned to each corporation as part of the
anonymous disclosure must be changed from year to year. Moreover, there
is no provision for identifying affiliated corporations. 189
B. West Virginia

Under legislation passed in 1991, the West Virginia Tax
Commissioner must publish in the State Register the name and address of
every taxpayer, whether a corporation or individual, receiving certain
tax credits, and the amount, by dollar category, of each credit received. 90
186. Today's Tax Highlights, STATE TAX NOTES, July 12, 1993, at 74; MAJORITY
REPORT, supra note 181, at 16. The Commission made further recommendations
on bank tax reform, administrative changes, improving audits and collections,
and forming a task force to study the taxation of insurance companies.

187. See Peter J. Howe, Disclosure Tax Bill Vote May Be Illegal, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1993, at 61.
188. See Mass. S.B. 1757.
189. Id.
190. Taxpayers that claim any of the following twelve tax credits are subject
to disclosure: Business Investment and Jobs Expansion Tax Credit; Industrial
Expansion and Revitalization Credit; Research and Development Credit;
Residential Housing Development Credit; Management Information Services
Facility; Coal Conversion Facility Credit; Coal Loading Facility Credit; Excess
Generation of Electricity from Coal Credit; Low Income Electric Utility Credit;
Low Income Gas Utility Credit; Low Income Telephone Utility Credit; Capital
Company Credit.
The following dollar categories are to be used in the required disclosure
report: Not more than $50,000; More than $50,000, but not more than $100,000;
More than $100,000, but not more than $250,000; More than $250,000, but not
more than $500,000; More than $500,000, but not more than $1,000,000; More than
$1,000,000. W. VA.CODE§ 11-10-5s(a) (1991).
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The statutorily-stated purpose behind the legislation was to
recognize "the citizens' right to accountable and efficient state
government." 9 ' The Department of Revenue will issue its first report in
December 1993.
Support for the disclosure legislation arose after publication of a
report by the West Virginia Department of Tax and Revenue. 19 2 This
study showed that only a small number of taxpayers benefit from the
West Virginia investment and jobs expansion credit ("supercredit"). 1' 3 As
of 1990, approximately 200 taxpayers had utilized the supercredit,
representing less than one percent of total corporate net income filers.
94
About fifty taxpayers claimed credits in excess of $100,000 annually.
The supercredit is used primarily by industries that have been reducing
employment, especially the coal industry, which between 1985 and 1988
received nearly ninety percent of the credit. According to the study, the
costs of the supercredit have escalated. In 1985, the supercredit cost
$287,000, but by fiscal year 1991, it was expected to cost the state $60
million. 19 The supercredit effectively eliminates all West Virginia tax
liabilities for a thirteen year period for most qualifying taxpayers.
Opponents resisted the disclosure legislation on the grounds that it
would impair West Virginia's business climate. Businesses did not lobby
strenuously against it, however, out of fear that the legislature might
actually reduce the supercredit.' 96 Although they were not successful at
stopping the legislation, businesses won a major concession in the way the
categories used for reporting purposes would be designated. The last
category, the "more than $1,000,000," was favored by large 197companies
"eager to conceal their annual tax credits of over $10,000,000.'

191. Id.
192. DAVID J. MUCHOW ET AL., FIRST REPORT ON SUPERCREDIT (1990).
"Supercredit" is the popular name for West Virginia's business investment and
job expansion tax credit.
193. This skewed distribution of the benefits also occurred in New York with
respect to that state's investment and employment tax credits. See Richard D.
Pomp, Reforming a State Corporate Income Tax, 51 ALB. L. REV. 375, 629-38 (1987).
194. Many of these findings parallel New York's experience with its
investment and employment tax credits. Id.
195. It is not uncommon for the cost of tax expenditures, such as investment
tax credits, to rapidly outstrip the revenue losses that were projected at the time
they were first being debated. Id. at 570, 617. For a more detailed discussion of
tax expenditures, see infra part IV.B.1.
196. M ASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at iii (Appendix).
197. Id.

19931

TURNING THE CLOCK BACK TO THE FUTURE

C. Arkansas
In 1991, Arkansas authorized the disclosure by name of taxpayer,
both individuals and corporations, of the amount of certain tax credits,
rebates, tax discounts, or commission for the collection of a tax received
by the taxpayer. 198
Arkansas law also provides that the disclosure requirement
encompasses any tax incentive program enacted after January 1, 1991
which provides a tax credit, tax rebate, tax discount, or commission for
the collection of a tax, with the exception of any such benefits under the
state income tax. 99 Although the law is drafted in terms of "disclosing"
the name of the taxpayer and the amount of the tax benefit, the
Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration is not required to
publish any type of report or to analyze the data covered by disclosure.2°0
Rather, a person must request the information from the Director of
Taxation, who must notify the taxpayer that information has been
requested. 201 The taxpayer has up to seven days to challenge the release
on the grounds that it would give an advantage to "competitors or
bidders," or that it is in some other way prohibited. 2°2 Apparently, only
a few businesses have opposed the release of information, although the
seven day period may discourage challenges.

198. Two percent discount for prompt payment of the sales tax;
Manufacturer's investment sales and use tax credit; Steel mill tax incentives;
Motor fuel shrinkage allowance; Arkansas Enterprise Zone Act [expires 19951;
Commission for sale of stamps for cigarettes in the collection of cigarette taxes;
Motion Picture Incentive Act of 1983; Credit on severance tax of oil producers;
Credit on severance tax of gas producers; Refund of motor fuel tax for
agricultural purposes; Refund of motor fuel tax by municipal buses; Refund of
distillate special fuel tax to interstate users; Credit against severance tax for
discovery of commercial oil pool; Native wine. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18303(b)(11)(A)-(P) (Michie 1987). The Massachusetts Staff Draft describes the
credits covered by the Arkansas disclosure law as "small" but offers no support
for this characterization. THE MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at 8.
199. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-303(b)(11)(Q) (Michie 1987).
200. There is no sanction against a newspaper, however, publishing such
information.
201. If the request is for information on 10 or less taxpayers, notice is mailed
to the taxpayers' addresses of record. Otherwise, notice is published once in a
newspaper having general circulation in the state. The person requesting the
information must reimburse the Department of Finance and Administration for
the cost of producing the information. Disclosable Tax Information, Ark. Reg.
1991-7 (1986).
202. § 26 -28- 30 3(g)(1).
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One group of taxpayers that successfully enjoined the Director from
disclosing information to an out-of-state competitor involved wholesale
tobacco distributors. They successfully argued in the lower court that
disclosing the amount of commissions received by cigarette wholesalers in
Arkansas for the sale of stamps and cigarettes and the collection of
cigarette taxes received by a tobacco wholesale grocery could be used to
determine total cigarette sales. In conjunction with other available data,
this disclosure would give competitors an advantage in marketing and
selling cigarettes. The decision currently is under appeal. 2°3
The disclosure legislation in Arkansas has a unique background, with
its roots in that state's Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). In 1986,
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that motor fuel tax records were subject
to disclosure under the Arkansas FOIA, one of the broadest public records
acts in the country.204 To overrule that case, key oil dealers in the
Arkansas Legislature sponsored a 1987 amendment that insured the
confidentiality of all tax returns and tax reports. The Arkansas Society of
Professional Journalists fought this amendment unsuccessfully in 1987, but
20
the journalists' persistent efforts led to the 1991 disclosure law.

Issues of tax reform did not play a dominant role in the Arkansas
discussions; the disclosure issue was basically argued in terms of openness
in government.206 Because income tax data were never within the purview
of the FOIA, no one during the debates over the 1991 law suggested that
disclosure be extended to that tax. Moreover, no one suggested that
information covered by the 1991 law be published by the state. Under
the FOIA, information would have been available only to the person
making the request, and the 1991 law, intended to mirror the status quo
ante under the FOIA, adopts a similar position.
D. Wisconsin

Wisconsin's first income tax law, enacted in 1911, prohibited tax
administrators from disclosing income tax information under penalty of
203.

See W.S. Compton v. Leathers, No. 92-7021, (Ark. Ch. Ct. 1992).

204. Ragland v. Yeargan, 702 S.W.2d 23 (Ark. 1986).
205. An earlier proposal would have required the disclosure of all records
and files of the Department of Revenue concerning all taxes except the income
tax. This bill was opposed on the grounds that it would jeopardize Arkansas'
exchange of information agreements with the IRS and with other states.
M ASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at x.
206. The provisions in the disclosure law dealing with economic development
reflected independent concerns about Japanese investment in Arkansas. The
information on the events leading up to the passage of the Arkansas disclosure
law is based on conversations with Arkansas journalists Dennis Schick (Aug. 16,
1993) and Carol Griffe (Aug. 17,1993).
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fine or imprisonment.20 7 In 1919, the statute was amended to permit
disclosure of income tax information to property tax assessors "as may be

necessary in the proper performance of [their] duties."20 8 In 1923, the

nondisclosure provisions were repealed, 20 9 partially in response to
concerns that corporations were using the secrecy provisions as a shield
for tax evasion. 210 From 1923 until 1953, the actual Wisconsin income tax
return was public information, 21 despite strong opposition from business
organizations2 12 and attempts by the legislature to restore the secrecy
provisions. 2 3 In 1953, anti-disclosure advocates succeeded in amending

207. 1911 Wis. Laws 658, § 1087m-24(1-3).
208. 1919 Wis. Laws 638, § 1087m-24(1).
209. 1923 Wis. Laws 39.
210. The Governor of Wisconsin called for repeal of the nondisclosure law
shortly after World War I, when federal tax officials notified him that many
Wisconsin corporations were underreporting their federal income taxes. N.Y.
REPORT, supra note 6, at 74. In 1943, in vetoing a bill to restore secrecy, Governor
Goodland described disclosure as "an important factor in enforcing just tax
obligations and in preventing tax-dodging and tax frauds." Wis. Sen. J. 1394 (July
13,1943).
211. A statute enacted in 1933 provided that "no person shall divulge or
circulate for revenue or offer to obtain, divulge or circulate for compensation any
information derived from an income tax return .. ." WIS. STAT. § 71.20 (1993). This
statute expressly excluded from its prohibition newspaper publication of income
tax information and reference to such information by public speakers. Id.
212. Anti-disclosure advocates included business organizations such as
Chambers of Commerce, along with a good many individuals. Groh, Where
Income Taxes are Public, THE REPORTER, Feb. 19, 1952. A Wisconsin newspaper
reporter who covered the state legislature in the late 1940's and early 1950's
recalls that the Wisconsin Manufacturers' Association opposed public
disclosure of income tax information and that the state's Republican Party made
repeal of disclosure a political priority, claiming that it "drove business and
wealthy people out of the state." Telephone interview with John Patrick Hunter,
Associate Editor, Madison Capital Times (Mar. 3, 1986).
213. The first bill to restore secrecy failed to pass. The second fared slightly
better-it passed the Legislature but was vetoed by Governor Goodland. In his
veto message, the Governor emphatically denounced the proposal to restore
income tax secrecy:
I have always contended and now contend that secrecy in government
is a bad thing; that taxation is a public matter; that the tax returns of
those who pay real estate and personal property taxes have no veil of
secrecy drawn over them; that no honest return need fear publicity; that
it is only the return made by the person or corporation that evades the
law that needs the veil of secrecy... to shut out from public view that
which may be a fraud, a cheat, or even a mistake.
(continued)
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the law to deny public access 214
to the actual tax returns but to permit
disclosure only of net taxes paid.
In Wisconsin, the public has access to the amount of income tax paid.
by both individuals and corporations. The state's Department of Revenue
must furnish to anyone who requests information about the net income tax,
franchise tax, or gift tax reported in any year by any individual or
corporation.21 The following conditions must be satisfied:
(1) individuals seeking the information must be Wisconsin
21 6
residents;
(2) persons must pay a four dollar fee per return from which
information is sought;
(3) persons must prove their identity and sign a statement
217
disclosing their addresses and reasons for making the request.
This information is sent to the individual or corporation whose tax
218
information is being requested.

Wis. Sen. J. 1397 (July 13, 1943). Goodland cited a large volume of citizen
communications urging him to veto the bill as evidence that public opinion
favored disclosure. Id. at 1395.
214. 1953 Wis. Laws 303. This statute incorporated a 1951 amendment that
instituted a $1 inspection fee and that required notifying the taxpayer whose tax
information was sought. 1951 Wis. Laws 714. The current statute is substantially
unchanged from its 1953 form. The MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182,
at 14, reports two reasons why Wisconsin changed its law from making the entire
state tax return public to making only the net tax paid public. One was concern
that state tax information would be abused by then-Wisconsin Senator Joseph
McCarthy. The other reason was the opposition of business groups, such as
chapters of the Chambers of Commerce. Id.
215. WIS. STAT. § 71.11(44)(b) (1984).
216. Id. This section prohibits disclosure to non-residents, or residents acting
on behalf of non-resident individuals, firms, or corporations, "except to the extent
that similar information in the state of residence of such person or firm or the
state of incorporation of such foreign corporation is made available to residents
of Wisconsin or Wisconsin corporations."
217. WIS. STAT. § 71.11(44)(b) (1984). The requirement that an individual state
the reason for making the request is meaningless in practice. Apparently,
information-seekers are not required to furnish any special reason; curiosity is
sufficient. Telephone interview with Nick Baldarotta, Custodian of Records,
Wisconsin Department of Revenue (Mar. 6, 1986).
218. WIS. STAT. § 71.11(44)(b). One department official reported that
notifying the taxpayer of the request for information deters some persons from
seeking information. "A lot of people are reluctant to let others know that they
(continued)
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The Wisconsin Action Coalition ("WAC") used this provision of the
Wisconsin law to compile a list of major corporations doing business in
Wisconsin that had not paid state income taxes. On two different
occasions, the WAC's work played a major role in the passage of
legislation establishing a new corporate minimum income tax. In both
cases, the Governor vetoed the proposed tax.219
E. Lessons to Date
What lessons can be drawn to date from the experience of other
states? As the efforts of Citizens for Tax Justice have demonstrated,
federal tax information in the public domain can be used constructively to
focus attention on the esoteric and sometimes intimidating world of
corporate taxation. What little experience exists at the state level is
consistent with CTJ's federal success. In Wisconsin, for example, the
Wisconsin Action Coalition was able to use publicly-available state data
to generate an informed discussion of the need for a corporate minimum
tax. The result of this discussion, to date, has been the passage by the
Wisconsin Legislature of two bills establishing a corporate minimum tax
and the veto of both bills by Governor Tommy Thompson.m
The laws in Arkansas, West Virginia, and Massachusetts were
enacted so recently that no information is yet available on their use or
impact. The first disclosures under the Massachusetts and West Virginia
legislation are scheduled for December 1993. The Arkansas disclosure
requirements were not motivated by tax reform considerations; whether
it will be used for this purpose may depend on the newspapers and other
media that advocated that state's law. The West Virginia legislation,
which deals only with credits, suffers because the categories for
presenting the data are not detailed enough to be very useful. 221 The
Massachusetts law has the potential for being catalytic because of the
are looking for information on their tax returns." Telephone interview with Nick
Baldarotta, supra note 217.
219. Conversation with Jeffrey Eagan, Executive Director, Wisconsin Action
Coalition (Aug. 18, 1993). Curiously, although the staff of the Massachusetts
Special Corrnission on Business Tax Policy interviewed Eagan, no mention is
made in the MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, that information
obtained under Wisconsin's disclosure law actually led to the passage twv
separate times of an alternative minimum corporate income tax. All that report
notes is that the Wisconsin Action Coalition's "widely publicized paper sparked a
debate about whether Wisconsin should adopt a minimum corporate income
tax." MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at 34 (citing telephone
interview with Jeff Egan [sic] of May 18, 1993).
220. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 190, 197 and accompanying text.
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heightened public attention and scrutiny by all sides. Its future is
problematic, however, due to the vitriolic opposition of elements of the
business community, the recent recommendation of the Special
on Business Policy, and the vote of the Massachusetts
Commission
222
Senate.
III. EVALUATING THE CASE FOR STATE-LEVEL TAX DISCLOSURE BY
PUBLICLY-TRADED CORPORATIONS
This portion of the article evaluates the arguments on behalf of
state-level disclosure. The arguments assume that disclosure would
apply to publicly-traded corporations, 2 which are already subject to the
extensive disclosure requirements of the SEC. These corporations not only
reveal extensive financial data about their activities, but also disclose
the amount of their federal income taxes as well as the aggregate amount
of their state income taxes. 224 State-level disclosure would require these
corporations to disaggregate information that they already make public,
albeit in aggregate form.
This section also considers the arguments against disclosure and
concludes that the arguments in favor easily outweigh the counter
arguments against it. Accordingly, the next section of the article
discusses some of the policy and technical issues that must be resolved in
formulating a state-level disclosure law.
A. Firm-Specific Disclosure is Necessary for Informed Tax Policy
Residents, businesses, and public officials in every state have an
obvious interest in the workings of their states' corporate income taxes, if
for no other reason that significant sums of money are involved both in
the amount of corporate taxes imposed and in the amount forgiven
through tax expenditures. 225 On a more fundamental level, state taxation
of corporate income, or the exemption from it, raises essential value
judgments about how the costs of government should be distributed. Both
large-scale corporate tax avoidance and inefficient tax expenditures
222. See supra notes 181, 188 and accompanying text.
223. See discussion infra part lV.A.
224. See supra text accompanying note 168.
225. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, STATE OF C ALIFORNIA, ANALYSIS
OF THE 1991-92 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET: OVERVIEW AND DETAILED COMPENDIUM
OF INDIVIDUALTAXEXPENDITURE PROGRAMS (1991) (California's tax expenditures
for bank and corporation tax programs are $1.8 billion); NEW YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, NEW YORK STATE TAX EXPENDITURE
REPORT, 1991-1992 (1991). For a discussion of tax expenditures, see infra part
WV.B.
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mean that a state must rely more heavily on the corporate tax than
otherwise, or rely on other taxes with different incidence patterns, or
reduce spending for important capital or operating purposes.
In addition to the questions raised regarding tax distribution between
corporations and individuals, another significant issue is how the
corporate tax burden is distributed among corporations in the same
industry and among different industries. At the federal level, at least
prior to the 1986 tax reforms, corporate tax incentives were shown
disproportionately to benefit certain industries and firms.226
The federal corporate income tax was characterized as striking interand intra-industry disparities in effective corporate tax rates. Similar
state tax differentials undoubtedly exist. In many states, the corporate
tax is replete with provisions that distinguish between small and large
corporations, in-state corporations and out-of-state corporations, capitalintensive corporations and labor-intensive corporations, and corporations
that sell out-of-state and those that sell within the state. 227 The 1986
federal tax reforms' objective to level the playing field remains a mere
fantasy in most states.
Tax credits and other incentives or subsidies features of the corporate
income tax present another major concern. To evaluate whether tax
incentives serve their ostensible purposes, researchers must know, at the
very least, which corporations received what types of incentives and in
what amounts. Only then can it be determined whether the benefits to
society of these incentives justify the forgone revenue, and whether such
incentives need to be enhanced, reduced, or redirected.
Firm-specific data facilitate consideration of a full range of issues
surrounding corporate tax policies. Disclosure facilitates informed and
critical evaluation of the distribution among corporations of tax burdens
and of corporate requests for tax relief- requests that may be underscored
by express or implied threats to abandon a state for a more favorable tax
climate. Disclosure allows the public to evaluate more effectively
corporate claims that their enterprises are straining under an excessive
tax burden. Disclosure would discourage corporations from misleading
legislators and the media by taking public positions that are inconsistent
with the facts.
Without firm-specific data, it is not possible to do the type of
analysis, known as microsimulation, which provides the most accurate
picture of the impact of tax policy changes. Only with microsimulation
is it possible to consider the interrelationship of different provisions of
the tax code. The use of aggregate data can result in significant over or
226. See, e.g., I THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT, TAX REFORM
FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984).
227. See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 193.

FOR
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underestimations of the impact of policy changes, particularly when
more than one change has been made, which is usually the case when tax
laws are revised.
Microsimulations provide an increasingly important tool to
sophisticated governmental tax policy units. An increasing number of
consulting firms are also developing microsimulation models of particular
state taxes on behalf of state agencies. These agencies realize that such
models are important if the agency is to participate in tax policy making
in an informed manner.
Microsimulations evaluate the impact of particular changes in the
tax law on both the yield of the tax involved and on the distribution of
the burden among taxpayers. For example, a corporate income tax
microsimulation model would allow the user to determine how much of a
reduction in the rate of a particular tax could be financed by eliminating
a particular credit without reducing the overall yield of the tax. A
model could also determine how such a revenue-neutral change would
redistribute the burden of the tax involved among industries or among
firms in different size categories; how many are likely to pay more and
how many are likely to pay less; and the number of such increases and
decreases that are likely to result in particular categories.
A microsimulation model for a particular tax involves the interaction
of two key components, both of which should be carefully developed and
maintained. The first component is a computer model or simulation of the
tax. Similar to the personal computer software that is now widely
available for computing federal personal income tax, this component
involves programming the model to compute the tax liability under
study. This programming should account for all the various options and
elections that the law allows and must be intricate enough to capture all
the nuances and subtleties that are characteristic of tax planning. The
difference between this component of a microsimulation model and the
software sold for tax preparation purposes is that the former must be
designed to provide the user with the ability to modify different aspects
of the rules (e.g., changes in the apportionment factor, changes in the
rules for combined reporting, alterations in the availability, size, or
nature of various deductions, exemptions, or credits) in order to determine
the impact of policy options on the tax liability of a taxpayer with a
particular mix of income, deductions, filing status, etc.
The second component would consist of a data base containing either
the universe of the taxpayers subject to the tax or a stratified sample of
actual taxpayers. In the case of microsimulation models for the personal
income tax, the typical data base is drawn from a statistically valid
sample of tax returns, with the identities of the taxpayers protected for
privacy reasons, and with weightings attached to each file based on the
total number of taxpayers for whom that sample file is representative.
Some state personal income tax simulation models use samples drawn
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from state tax returns, while others use a sample of the federal tax
returns filed by residents of the state involved.
For the corporate income tax, no comparable data base is available.
Because of the relatively small number of corporate income taxpayers
compared to personal income taxpayers, and the relatively small number
of firms that represent the bulk of a state's corporate tax revenues, it is
impossible to take a statistically valid sample of returns without the
risk of identifying individual firms. Consequently, the data necessary to
create a corporate microsimulation model are not available, under current
law, to parties outside state revenue departments. This significantly
limits the ability of other interested organizations to participate in the
most informed manner possible in debates over corporate tax policy. Only
with firm-specific corporate tax disclosure can this important tool be
used most effectively to enhance openness and accountability in the tax
legislative process.
An additional constraint exists in developing a valid data base for
state corporate microsimulation models. While a state personal income
tax microsimulation model can be constructed with a sample of federal
tax returns filed by residents of the state involved, this would not be
possible with regard to the corporate income tax.
Unlike a state corporate income tax, states tax their residents on
their worldwide income. A state sample built on federal returns can be
derived for the personal income tax because the individual who files a
federal return is considered to reside in the state indicated in his or her
mailing address. Worldwide income can be determined from the federal
income (although some adjustments are typically necessary). By contrast,
states tax corporations on an apportioned share of their income. Unlike
the individual taxpayer, an enterprise's state of incorporation and
consequently its state of residency is not significant. Moreover, the
amount of income that a corporation reports to a state cannot be
determined from the federal return. State-level corporate disclosure,
such as that enacted last year in Massachusetts, would allow for the
development of an effective corporate microsimulation model at the
state-level.
In addition to facilitating the use of microsimulations, other areas
require firm-specific data rather than aggregate data. For example, it is
virtually impossible based only on statistical aggregates to evaluate the
claims of various corporations for tax relief or to verify other tax-related
information that corporations might provide in their lobbying efforts.
Moreover, evaluating the worth of various tax incentives without
knowing the identity of the beneficiaries is inherently difficult. Indeed,
the only way to conduct a meaningful cost-benefit analysis of a provision
like the investment tax credit is to identify the major beneficiaries and
do longitudinal studies using other sources of data, such as employment
and investment data.
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Disclosure eliminates one of the subtle but serious defects with the
use of aggregate data. All too often, researchers are interested in the
"outliers." For example, a 1982 study of the New York investment and
employment tax credits indicated that two corporations received nearly
forty percent of all of the credits allowed, totaling $56.8 million. 228 Yet,
on an aggregate basis, the average credit claimed was $16,423 and half of
the claimants received credits of less than $1172. Clearly, statistical
aggregates can simply hide much of value in evaluating a state tax
system. If, for example, a few of the largest corporations in a state pay no
or only a minimum income tax, such information is highly relevant from a
policy perspective, but might be lost if buried in an aggregate. 2 9
Moreover, firm-specific information on gross receipts, gross sales, or
gross profits is essential in attempting to pinpoint the use of transfer
pricing to minimize tax liabilities. For example, an analysis of similar
firms in the same industry might reveal differing ratios of tax-to-gross
receipts. Knowing the identity of the corporations involved can help
identify which ones constitute the multicorporate families that might
reduce their state taxes through intercorporate transfers. A correlation
between low ratios of tax-to-gross receipts and transactions among
related corporations merits further attention as a possible situation
involving transfer pricing abuse. 230
In addition, publishing statistical data without identifying the
taxpayers involved inevitably limits its use by researchers. Statistical
information can be presented in various ways. For example, income taxes

228. See Pomp, supra note 193, at 630-35.
229. See supra note 182. One of the criticisms of a paper produced by the
Staff of the Massachusetts Commission was that it was forced to rely on the use
of aggregates, averages, and medians, and could not identify any outliers.
Furthermore, a meaningful effective tax rate calculation, which is needed to
determine the uniformity of a state corporate income tax, is impossible to
develop without some measure of book income that can be applied on a
corporation-by-corporation basis, and this requires knowing the identity of each
taxpayer.
230. The MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at 32, acknowledges
the problem of transfer pricing but concludes that "[in order to evaluate the
degree to which the Commonwealth's multicorporate taxpayers engage in such
practices, investigators would need the tax returns and financial records of every
affiliate of a company, including those in other states. Only auditors have, and
should have, the authority to subpoena such an extensive array of documents."
Id. Apparently the report overlooks the possibility of identifying transfer pricing
situations as suggested in the text. For one recent state example of a situation
involving transfer pricing and the use of a Delaware holding company in an
unsuccessful attempt to minimize tax, see Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
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paid by a corporation can be compared with its receipts, property, number
of employees, amount of assets, type of business, and so forth. The value
of the data is obviously constrained by the way it is presented. What
might be a valuable presentation for some policy makers and researchers
would be irrelevant for others. By contrast, if the data are presented
with the name of the corresponding corporations, researchers can
correlate the tax information with any other sources of data.
Researchers can pursue whatever issues are most relevant then, or at any
time in the future. Without knowing the name of the corporations,
researchers would not be able to use the information disclosed in
conjunction with the information in Form 10-K's, annual reports, and
other data bases.
Finally, many states today routinely publish aggregate data on
corporate taxes. What has occurred is that the fear of violating existing
laws on the privacy of tax returns constrains the publication of statistical
data. Situations commonly exist in which knowing certain limited
information about an unnamed corporation, such as its size and the nature
of it primary business activities, allows an informed judgment and a
corresponding inference to be made about its identity. Consequently, in
order to avoid publishing statistical information in a manner that
facilitates identifying particular corporations, a common practice is to
sanitize the data by intentionally aggregating it and presenting it as
part of a larger group or class. Obviously, the need to present data in a
manner that protects the identity of a taxpayer reduces the value of the
information that is made public. Moreover, those situations in which the
data need to be sanitized are probably the precise circumstances in which
the public interest is greatest because they involve major taxpayers.
As the above discussion demonstrates, the practice of using statistical
aggregates is no substitute for data on a corporation-by-corporation
basis."' Nonetheless, the Massachusetts Special Commission suggested
that firm-specific data could be released on an anonymous or coded basis.
This suggestion is evaluated below. 232

231. Without addressing any of the arguments in the text, the Chairman of
the Massachusetts Commission on Business Tax Policy concluded that
"disclosure does not bring additional information to the table." MAJORITY R EPORT,
supra note 181, at 18.
232. See infra part III.E.

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[22:373

B. Firm-Specific Disclosure is Essential to Public Understanding and
Support of Corporate Tax Reform
Public understanding of seemingly complex issues has been essential
to the development and implementation of the many important reforms
instituted at the state and national levels during the twentieth century.
Public awareness, understanding, and pressure laid the groundwork for
food and drug laws, securities laws, antitrust laws, wage and hour laws,
and statutes regulating the rates of railroads, public utilities, and other
firms with monopoly power. Public opinion was critical in supporting the
corporate tax changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In our system of
democratic capitalism with its extensive system of checks and balances,
significant economic reforms usually require the force of public opinion.
Obviously, public opinion is not sufficient in and of itself for the
enactment of major reforms, but it is clearly a necessary condition.
Economists, lawyers, and other "experts" can develop an
understanding of complex issues in the abstract, based on either
theoretical or empirical reasoning. But for the non-specialist, the
intelligent layperson who does not devote his or her working life to
mastering a particular issue or problem, real-life examples help develop
the necessary understanding. To be sure, government officials cannot
justify far reaching changes on the basis of anecdotal information. At the
same time, however, legislators are unlikely to enact legislation, even if
based on sound theoretical and empirical reasoning, if they are unable to
explain the need for such laws to the ordinary citizen; nor, in our form of
democracy, should they be able to do so.
As the federal experience in 1986 powerfully demonstrates, without
disclosure the public will remain strangers to the world of corporate tax
reform. Aggregate data or even firm-specific anonymous data233 provide
no substitute for disclosure. It is a basic truth that in order to spark
interest in an issue it must be made real and human. A cold statistic is just
that-cold. Eyes glaze and interest wanes. Policy makers and other
concerned citizens cannot have a dialogue with a statistic. The impact
that CTJ had on federal tax reform provides a dramatic example of the
effectiveness of using "warm bodies" rather than impersonal data. After
all, no shortage of statistics existed before CTJ's work, but the arid raw
data alone were not enough to galvanize the public into supporting
sweeping reform.
Opponents of disclosure contend that the general public is relatively
unsophisticated about tax matters and would be unable to understand the
significance and implications of corporate tax information. According to
233. See sources cited supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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opponents, only tax experts can understand the multifarious and complex
factors that interact to generate a corporation's tax liability. The public
will merely be confused, or unreasonably angered, by learning of nominal
corporate tax liabilities.
The public lacks the astuteness and
sophistication to appreciate why a corporation's liabilities are only
nominal. 234 Of course, the fact that the public is relatively uninformed
about state corporate taxes is an argument in favor of-not againstdisclosure.
Taken seriously, the "public will misunderstand" argument would
emasculate much of the SEC disclosure requirements as well as similar
provisions in other legislation.3 The lay public may not be able to read
a balance sheet, but it can understand those who are able to translate the
impenetrable world of financial accounting into comprehensible
language. The public may not have fathomed the intricacies of tax
shelters, accelerated depreciation, or investment tax credits, but it
understood the need to reform the federal tax system in 1986.
This "ignorant public" argument ultimately challenges the premises
underlying a democratic society. A well-functioning democracy requires
an informed public. If corporate officers feel that the disclosed
information would likely be misinterpreted, they can educate the public
by providing more information and a fuller explanation.236 If the media
report a large, profitable corporation with a seemingly low tax liability,
that taxpayer can use its public relations resources to explain, for
example, how the existence'of loss carryovers or tax credits helped lower
3 7
its tax liability23
This dialectical process is one that routinely occurs in

contemporary society, exemplified by corporations that buy advertising
space in newspapers and magazines regarding tort or health care reform,
plant closings, labor disputes, or alleged malfeasance by corporate

234. Strauss notes "that the tax circumstances facing a multistate business in
other states is not to be reported to the [Massachusetts] Secretary of State for
subsequent public inspection, the possibilities for misunderstanding and/or
misinformation appear to be significant." Strauss, supra note 182. However,
Massachusetts law allows a corporation to provide any other information to the
Secretary of State that it deems necessary. Even without this provision, a
corporation could always use its public relations resources to avoid any
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of published data.
235. See infra notes 236-53 and accompanying text.
236. The Massachusetts legislation provides this opportunity. See supra note
184 and accompanying text.
237. The Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy
described the provision in Massachusetts law that allows corporations to explain
the disclosed information or provide additional information, as "connot[ing] guilt
until innocence is proven." MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 181, at 20.
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officers. This process plays a critical role in a healthy democracy. 238
Perhaps the real fear is not that the public will misunderstand but that
it will understand too well. As the Staff of the Massachusetts Special
Commission on Business Tax Policy observed, "disclosure of tax
information on specific companies has proven to be an effective means of
crystallizing support for tax reform."' 9
C. Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant:
Openness and Accountability

Disclosure Would Promote

State disclosure is just another reminder that as Justice Brandeis
observed, "sunlight is the best of disinfectants." 240 Not surprisingly, the
principal architects of the early securities acts were disciples of Justice
Brandeis. 241 Good government requires openness; the free flow of
information is a remedy for poor policies and political ills. "Information
is the currency of the 'marketplace of ideas,' the prerequisite for
political self-determination, and a security against usurpation by secret
cabals." 242 In short, public information provides a check on government
through public accountability, which is especially valuable in the
opaque world of taxation. Openness and accountability make it less
likely that tax laws will be made behind closed doors, where special
interests will prevail over the public good.

238. In comments that could describe debate over any controversial issue of
the day, the Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax policy
concluded that,
public disclosure .. .may confuse rather than clarify debate about
corporate tax equity. Some commentators are likely to oversimplify
their analysis, claiming inequities and distortions when none in fact
exists. Such charges, rather than leading to enlightened debate, could
engender acrimony and hostility between public interest groups and
businesses, damaging the Commonwealth's already shaky business
climate.

supra note 181, at 20.
M ASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note

MAJORITY REPORT,

239.

182, at 1.

240. Louis D.

BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1932).
241. SEC DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF A DMINISTRATIVE
POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 SECURITIES A cT 50 (1969) [hereinafter SEC
DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS]1

242.

Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters, 140 U. PA. L. REV.

1,6 (1991).
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The modem trend in the United States, inspired in part by the SEC,
calls for more disclosure. 243 The SEC's disclosure requirements had a
significant influence on several pieces of legislation that Congress passed
following World War II, including numerous air, water, and toxic
244
substances pollution statutes; the Occupational Safety and Health Act;
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act;24" the Freedom of Information
Act; 24 6 the Truth in Lending ACt; 24 7 the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act;248 the Consumer Credit Protection Act;249 the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act; 250 the Fair Credit Reporting Act; 25' and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (Pension Reform Act). 21 2 As
these various pieces of legislation exemplify, our society has a clear bias
in favor of making information available, not only so that we may make
informed decisions, but also so that we may have confidence in our
institutions. We should esteem disclosure for the same reason we should
esteem "sunlight"-because it illuminates. 32s
"Sunlight" with respect to state corporate tax data will help to
restore confidence in the tax system, as well as in the business community.
If disclosure demonstrates that the current tax system comports with
generally acceptable norms, the public should be assured that large
businesses are good "citizens." If, on the other hand, disclosure helps to
identify shortcomings in the current law, it will provide the basis for
necessary reform, which will restore public confidence in the corporate
sectors and in the tax system.
D. State-Level Disclosure Will Complement SEC-Mandated Disclosure
Compared with the extensive information already in the public
domain because of SEC requirements, state disclosure appears modest and
mundane. Primarily through the efforts of the SEC, the public has been
243. Id. at 119 ("Dissemination of information is a large part of contemporary
government practice.").
244. 29 U.S.C. 651-78 (1988 &Supp. 111990).
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e17(1988).
246. 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1986).
247. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-13,1631-44, 1661-65,1671-77 (1986).

248. 15 U.S.C. § 1701-20 (1960).
249. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 302-05, 307, 401-15, 503, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974).
250. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2602-04, 2607, 2609, 2616-17 (1989).
251. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1968).

252. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 (1974). These examples are cited in Russell B.
Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 50 (1976); see

also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION
253. See Kreimer, supra note 242, at 7.

OF WALL STREET

561 (1982).
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given a picture window into the financial affairs, including the income
tax data, of publicly-traded corporations. State disclosure would open
that window a crack more.
Moreover, state disclosure would improve the utility of the SECrequired information to many users of financial statements. Among the
primary users of the tax information in SEC-mandated financial
statements are securities analysts and other financial analysts who
evaluate the financial performance of publicly-traded corporations.
Many occasions exist when an analyst must remove an unusual and nonrecurring income or expense from an income statement in order to evaluate
the on-going performance of the corporation involved. 2 4 "When a nonrecurring item needs to be removed from the income statement, the tax
results of that item also need to be removed."' 25 A failure to take the tax
consequences of such an item into consideration will distort the analysis
of income by the use of an improper tax rate and will also result in an
inconsistent presentation of the balance sheet. Although the SECrequired disclosure is sufficient to adjust for the federal consequences of
the item, it will in many cases not be sufficient to make the necessary
change in the state tax results.
The SEC-disclosed federal tax information is also used by analysts to
determine how well or poorly the company's management handles tax
planning and implementation. 2 6 This aspect of the analyst's work could
also be enhanced by the availability of state-specific data.
Some critics of state-level disclosure have argued that the
availability of information of a firm's state tax liability might
somehow disclose proprietary information. 2 57 If this were true, then the
current SEC requirement for disclosure of the aggregate amount of state
income taxes would have more of a negative impact on those corporations
paying state income taxes to only one (or a few) state(s) than on those
operating nationwide or internationally. Disclosure would then level
the playing field among these publicly-traded corporations.
State disclosure would level the playing field in yet a different
manner. According to some commentators, the public knows a great deal
about small and medium-sized corporations because they are more
specialized than larger corporations. For the smaller, more specialized
corporations, the annual report and Form 10-K provide real insight into
their line of business. "But not so with a large conglomerate corporation
254. For example, this must be done to assess the quality of a firm's earnings
and the trends in its income and expenses that are likely to continue.
255. B ENJAMiN GRAHAM ET AL., GRAHAM AND DODD'S SECURITY ANALYSIS 275
(1988).
256. Id.
257. See infra part III.G.
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whose annual report masks more than it reveals. Not surprisingly,
therefore, it is the large corporation that invariably resists steps to
strengthen disclosure requirements-steps that in practice would, at most,
place it on a par with smaller corporations.' 5 s8
E. Why Not Disclose Firm-Specific Data Anonymously?
The Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy
recommended that the state's current law be amended to provide for the
release of data on a corporation-by-corporation basis but without
identification of the name of the corporation.2 59 For example,
information on each corporation would be available but a corporation
might be identified only by a number that would not reveal its identity.
Although this approach would allow those corporations which lie
at the statistical extreme to be identified rather than being buried in a
statistical aggregate, the other inherent defects of using aggregates
would remain. For example, the enhancement of public and legislative
understanding would be as difficult to achieve with anonymous
corporation-by-corporation data as it has proven to be when only
aggregate data are. available. In addition, researchers would be limited
to only what was published and would have no way of tapping other
sources of data. The cross-tabulation of the disclosed tax data with other
publicly-available information would be impossible. Inter- and intraindustry studies would be impossible. Longitudinal studies would be
2 60
difficult, as would studies about the effectiveness of tax incentives.
Corporations would still be able to take public positions that would be
inconsistent with the facts. None of the goals of accountability, openness
in government, and the involvement of the public in issues of tax reform
would likely be achieved with anonymous disclosure. Information that
Corporation #123 has paid the minimum tax despite over $100 million in
profits will be unlikely to have any lasting effect on tax reform. By
comparison, disclosure by name of corporation has proven to be an
effective means of mobilizing support for reform. 261

258.

Robert K. Mueller, Corporate Disclosure: The Public's Right to Know, in

FINANCIAL REPORTING, supra note 155, at 71.
259. MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 181, at 10.

260. Undercutting whatever minimal benefits might flow from anonymous
disclosure, the Massachusetts Senate passed a bill providing that the number
identifying a corporation would change every year. See supra note 188 and
accompanying text. This approach would obviously eliminate the possibility of
conducting longitudinal studies.
261. MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at 1.
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Anonymous disclosure will be particularly problematical in states in
which the disclosure system is being administered by an agency other
than the state tax department. In Massachusetts, the administering
official (the Secretary of State) has no basis on which to evaluate the
accuracy of the information submitted. With anonymous disclosure, this
problem is compounded because the information submitted by a firm does
not have to stand the test of public scrutiny by those who would have a
basis for evaluating its accuracy in terms of general orders of magnitude.
This might include securities analysts, other researchers and tax reform
groups.
Finally, anonymous disclosure will inevitably lead to public
speculation about the identity of corporations. 262 Because the benefits of
anonymous disclosure are insignificant, a state might as well dash public
speculation by identifying the corporations by name. Indeed, if disclosure
provides valuable information to competitors, as opponents have
argued, 263 these competitors presumably would try to match the released
information with public information from Form 10-K and other sources.
Those willing to go to this trouble will inevitably break through the
anonymity. Consequently, anonymous disclosure does not protect against
any competitive disadvantages but only against public attention and
scrutiny.
The above discussion, combined with the favorable experience at the
national and, to a more limited extent, at the state levels establish a
presumptive case in favor of disclosure. Unless compelling reasons exist,
state tax data should not be immunized from public scrutiny. The
2
remainder of this section examines such arguments. "
F. Will Disclosure Violate a Corporation'sRight to Privacy?
The extent of SEC-required disclosure of information by publiclytraded corporations makes it obvious that such corporations have long
ago surrendered any claim that their financial data should be protected
under some right of privacy. If the disclosure of their federal income tax
liabilities and other financial information does not raise a constitutional
issue, then neither should the disclosure of their state tax information.
As early as 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a federal law that
provided for the public inspection of corporate tax returns against attacks
262. For example, depending on the information covered by disclosure, it
might be possible to try to identify the corporations by matching such
information with Form 10-K reports and annual reports.
263. See infra part III.G.
264. The remainder of this Section is based upon the author's experiences in
various states as well as the issues that emerged in the Massachusetts debate.
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that it was unconstitutional.
The modern day version
of this argument
266
is that disclosure will reveal proprietary information.
To be sure, in certain situations the business affairs of a corporation
may be closely identified with those of the shareholders. Revealing the
taxes paid by a small, "mom and pop," closely-held corporation might be
viewed as violating legitimate expectations of privacy by its
shareholders. However, such corporations would be exempt from
267
disclosure requirements limited to publicly-traded corporations.
G. Will Disclosure Reveal Proprietary Information?
A corporation can assert a legitimate interest in protecting the
confidentiality of proprietary information. Opponents of disclosure
assert that revealing a corporation's state tax data would reveal
proprietary information. 268 These kinds of arguments have long marked
debates over the disclosure of any kind of financial information. In the
era before 1933, the hesitation of many businesses to disclose what
currently is considered necessary balance sheet and income statement
information and the more recent reluctance of many firms to disclose, or
effectively disclose, line-of-business data earnings projections have been
explained by business representatives as fear of revealing useful data to
competitors. 269 Typically, these arguments are based more on fear than on
reality. To illustrate, consider the following argument used by A.H. Belo
265. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). The Supreme Court has also
made it clear that corporations cannot claim equality with individuals regarding
rights to privacy. United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
266. See infra part III.G.
267. See infra part V.A.
268. Strauss speculates that for small, public companies and for companies

with foreign competitors disclosure will provide competitors with the private
details of the company's activities. Strauss, supra note 182, at 13. This problem is
most pronounced for small, public companies and for companies with foreign
creditors since "there will be an identity between their state and federal return
and what they provide to the Massachusetts Secretary of State for public review.
They would now have their private financial affairs subject to competitive
scrutiny." Id. In the case that Strauss is worried about, where the state and
federal returns are identical, it is unclear what a competitor will learn under
Massachusetts law that it will not already know from examining the Form 10-K or
the company's annual reports. Strauss does not discuss this possibility because

his entire paper fails to mention SEC-mandated disclosure. Moreover, Strauss
does not address the time delay in publishing any tax information. Finally, if
foreign competitors were filing state income tax returns, they could-and
should-be subject to disclosure. See infra part W.A.
269.

JOEL SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE FuTuRE OF FINANCE 203 (1985).
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Corporation, owner of the Dallas Morning News, against a minority
shareholder proposal that it become a publicly-listed company:
The company maintains that publishing information
required of public companies by the SEC would put it at a severe
competitive disadvantage, since the data would be available to
its main competitor, the Dallas Times Herald, which is owned
by Times Mirror Co., Los Angeles.
Belo maintains that because it is significantly smaller than
Times Mirror, financial disclosures required by the SEC would
reveal too much of its inner workings. Times Mirror owns several
major papers and can group its newspaper financial data for
reporting purposes. By contrast, the Dallas Morning News is the
only major newspaper property of Belo.270
In responding to the company's argument, one commentator noted
that,
[Oin at least the revenue side, competing sources already provide
considerable information about the Dallas Morning News. This
paper is a member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations which
publishes very detailed unit circulation figures on the Dallas
Morning News every six months. The advertising rates of the
paper are readily available to an external party in a booklet
titled Retail Advertising Rates. The list of advertising clients of
the paper is available for 15o a day (50o on Sunday). These
competing sources of information are considerably more detailed
and cover more facets than does the sales figure required in the
2
10K of a publicly listed company. "'
The same competitive arguments were made in 1973 against the SEC's
successful proposal to require more extensive reporting of federal income
tax data. 272 Opponents argued that the disclosure of tax information

270. A.H. Belo Shareholders Approve Reverse Split, Block Bid to Go Public,
WALL STREET JOURNAL,

271.

Dec. 29, 1978, at 15.

George Foster, Externalities and Financial Reporting, 35 J. OF FINANCE

521, 524-25 (1980). The disclosure of sales information in the SEC Form 10-K was
also objected to on the grounds that it would cause single-product firms
"competitive disadvantage." Id. at 531.
272. See Adoption of Amendment to Regulations S-X, SEC Accounting Series
Release No. 149 (Nov. 28, 1973).
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would reveal tax strategies to competitors, 2 3 but no examples were
provided. The SEC concluded that the needs of investors are best served
by additional reporting even though there may be an increased risk of
adverse consequences at the hands of competitors.274 SEC regulations and
other federal laws already require many corporations to disclose
extensive tax and financial information, and apparently such disclosures
have not jeopardized the economic interests of the corporations.
When pressed, those who argue that disclosure will reveal
proprietary information have never been able to provide a detailed
illustration.275 They have never been able to articulate how knowing the
amount of tax that a competitor paid reveals anything of competitive
value. Moreover, even if this information were relevant in the abstract,
it is unlikely to be available in a timely-enough fashion to be very
useful.
For information to be valuable, a business needs to know yesterday
what a competitor is going to do tomorrow. By the time a corporation
requests the normal extensions and files its return-a precondition to the
public's gaining access to whatever tax information is subject to
disclosure-the information will be stale (or could be aged to ensure that
it becomes stale). Yesterday's information obtained tomorrow is
worthless to a competitor. For a businessperson to learn two years after
the fact that a competitor paid $X in state taxes or claimed $Y in state
credits pales by comparison with what can be learned by all traditional
ways of obtaining current information about competitors-reading the
trade press, "schmoozing" at trade shows and conventions, searching
computer data bases, or hanging out at the local bars that dot the
perimeter of large plants.
In investigating the degree to which information divulged under
Massachusetts law might be useful to competitors, the staff of the
Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy interviewed
twelve industry analysts. The analysts specialized in different
industries including banking, life insurance, biotechnology, electronic
273. It was also alleged that disclosure would lead taxing authorities to
question tax deductions or challenge the taxpayer's favorable interpretation of
items.
274. See SELIGMAN, supra note 269, at 203.
275. Even the concept of proprietary information has no fixed meaning. A
former Commissioner of Taxation for New York lists without any explanation the
following examples of proprietary information that a New York corporation is
required to identify on its state franchise tax return: real estate, whether owned
or leased; inventories; other tangible personal property; and business receipts.
James H. Tully, Jr., State Tax Secrecy Laws and Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas in
Non-Tax Investigations, 46 ALB. L. REV. 78, 84 (1981). A fortiori, much of the
information on SEC Form 10-K would be "proprietary."
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components, retailing, and computer services. Of the twelve analysts,
eight stated that the Massachusetts law Would reveal little information
of value to competitors for the following reasons: 1) comparable
information is available from other reports, such as annual financial
reports and reports compiled by consulting firms and underwriters; 2) the
information would not be disaggregated sufficiently to be of much value,
even if reported on a subsidiary-by-subsidiary basis;2 6 3) tax accounting

principles differ so much from financial accounting principles (especially
in the case of banks) that tax information provides very little insight
into the financial condition and operational characteristics of a
company; 4) the information would be disclosed with a long lag; and
finally, 5) companies have the option of disclosing either gross profit or
tax credit carryovers under Massachusetts law.2m

One analyst suggested that disclosure might provide insight into
product trends and profitability which, over time, might allow
competitors to determine business strategies? 8 How a competitor might
determine business strategies from the disclosed tax information was
never explained. It was also alleged that corporate raiders could use the
information to help them select targets for hostile takeovers, 279 which
seems somewhat fanciful because of the time lags involved. Takeover
targets are most likely selected from the best and most current
information available about a firm's national and international
financial conditions; Massachusetts tax data, disclosed two or more years
after the fact, could hardly be very relevant. The analyst stated that
the resulting anti-competitive damage would be most severe in industries
where the pace of innovation is slow but price competition is intense, such
as retailing.280 But another analyst, specializing in retailing, felt that
the data divulged in tax disclosure reports would reveal nothing that
rivals do not already know from other sources.281

Yet another analyst agreed that disclosure would be especially
harmful to retailers because it would provide insights into the
profitability of Massachusetts retail markets with respect to those of
other states. Also, by analyzing the tax data of specific stores, in
276. Corporations that file on a combined basis in Massachusetts will release
the information covered by disclosure on a combined basis. Even if only one
member of the group has extensive operations in Massachusetts, the released
data will be aggregated for the combined group as a whole. It is difficult
understanding how Massachusetts competitors will learn anything useful from
disclosure in this situation.
277. MASSACHUSETrS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at 21-22.
278. Id. at 18.
279. Id.
280 * Id. at 22.
281. Id. at 23.
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conjunction with other publicly available data, competitors would gain
insights into which products in Massachusetts stores are most profitable.
Out-of-state rivals could use the data to decide whether to expand stores
282
and which products it should market aggressively within that state.
Left unexplained (once again) was how tax data would help identify
which products were most profitable. A retailer, such as a department
store, might sell thousands of different products. Even assuming that the
pace of innovation is slow in the retail industry, certainly fads exist and
this year's hot seller may well be next year's dog. The time lag
inevitable under any disclosure law would seem to limit the usefulness for
competitive purposes of any released information. It is unclear how a
competitor would be helped today by learning about which products were
relatively profitable two or so years ago. Finally, in areas of retailing,
such as apparel, where orders are typically placed months in advance of
sale, it is not even clear how a competitor might capitalize on
information that was current, rather than at least one year old.
An analyst specializing in life insurance commented on the possible
competitive harm that tax disclosure will inflict on automobile
insurers. 2s3 In the view of the comments from this analyst, many auto
insurers believe that Massachusetts is an unattractive place to do
business because of its reputation for bad drivers. Recently, however, the
automobile insurance market has been profitable. Yet, because the
perception lingers that Massachusetts is a poor market, out-of-state
competitors stay away.
If believable, these comments describe a rather unsophisticated
insurance industry, one in which automobile insurers have no more refined
information about the Massachusetts market than its reputation,
whether deserved or not, for having poor drivers. Presumably, the
industry has better means than relying on hearsay for determining
whether automobile insurance is profitable in Massachusetts. 284
But more fundamentally, suppose the analyst is correct and because of
disclosure more insurance companies started to write policies in
Massachusetts. Presumably, this competition would be good for
policyholders, resulting in lower premiums and a greater choice of
282. Id. at 22-23.
283. Id. at 23.
284. During a hearing on disclosure, numerous witnesses asserted that
disclosure would provide helpful information to their Competitors. Not one,
however, provided an example that linked the disclosed data with any conclusion
that would be useful to competitors. Moreover, none of these witnesses
addressed any of the points raised by the analysts in the text who felt that
disclosure would reveal little valuable information. See Transcript of Public
Hearing, Massachusetts Special Commission on Business Tax Policy (June 1,
1993).
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options. Indeed, one of the characteristics of a market economy is the
general bias in favor of the free flow of information. Unlike a patent,
copyright, or some other form of intellectual property, a company should
not be able to assert a proprietary interest in whether Massachusetts is a
profitable place to write car insurance. Similarly, to the extent that
disclosure would increase competition in retailing, consumers would
ultimately benefit from the lower prices. Moreover, increased jobs might
also be expected.
Indeed, an accepted goal of disclosure in other contexts is increased
competition. For example, the Federal Trade Commission's "Line of
Business" disclosures instituted in 1974 had as one of their beneficial
effects the "increased competition in product markets; firms considering
entry into new markets
would be better able to discern existing 'excess'
25
profit situations.

To the extent that disclosure leads to more competition, it is
consistent with a market economy. "Contrary to the assertions of many
corporate spokesmen, corporate secrecy-not corporate disclosure-is the
great enemy of a market economy in a free society." 28 ' A market economy
relies on the self-corrective mechanism of the marketplace to keep
competition robust and monopoly in check. A firm that holds a strong
market position resulting in higher than ordinary profits induces the
entry into the field of new businesses. 28 7 To the extent that disclosure
reinforces this mechanism, it facilitates the dynamics of a market
economy. This philosophy is similar to that underlying the SEC
disclosure rules:
The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the
theory that competing judgments of buyers or sellers as to the fair
price of the security brings about a situation where the market
price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.... There cannot be
'
honest markets without honest publicity.28
Consequently, even assuming the analyst is correct, the scale does not
necessarily tip in favor of nondisclosure.
Further evidence that the competitive harm argument might be
exaggerated comes from Arkansas, where businesses subject to disclosure
can apply for an exemption on the grounds that the release of the
285. Foster, supra note 271, at 531. The Line of Business Program was
abandoned during the Reagan years. Peter W. Rodino, Antitrust is Dead-Long
Live Antitrust, 76 GEO. L. J.507,519 (1987).
286. Mueller, supra note 258, at 71.
287. Id.
288. H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1934).
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requested information would result in competitive harm.2 9 Apparently,
very few businesses have ever requested such an exemption, 290 although
the short seven day period may discourage such requests. To be sure, the
Arkansas procedure provides a safety valve; in a state such as
Massachusetts where the business community has aggressively fought
against disclosure, the safety valve will turn into a dilatory tactic to
undercut the law.
H. Will Disclosure Discourage the Filing of Accurate Tax Returns?
The successful operation of the U.S. income tax depends on the
voluntary cooperation of taxpayers. A commonly stated rationale for
protecting the confidentiality of tax information is to facilitate tax
enforcement by encouraging a taxpayer to make full and truthful
declarations in its return, without fear that those statements will be
revealed or used against it for other purposes. The assumption is that
even limited access by government agencies to information obtained from
tax returns will deter some taxpayers from truthful reporting. Secrecy is
a necessary palliative to taxpayers who might otherwise falsify their
tax returns if they knew that non-tax officials would have access to that
information.
The "full and frank disclosure" rationale presumes that secrecy helps
assure honesty and that publicity discourages it.291 If this presumption is
correct, the SEC reporting requirements must have led to less honest tax
returns-a position that apparently has never been argued in the
literature-and one that seems far fetched on its face. If corporations
were not induced to file false federal returns by SEC disclosure, why
should it be assumed they will do so in response to state disclosure?
Moreover, some researchers have even cast doubt on the asserted
relationship between tax return confidentiality and honest reporting by
examining a 1976 federal change, in response to Watergate, which
dramatically increased the degree of confidentiality accorded federal
289. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
291. Opponents of disclosure argue that it will encourage rather than deter
tax avoidance because firms will fear the release of proprietary information that
could help competitors. MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at 28. The
fact that opponents of disclosure believe that it will encourage rather than deter
tax avoidance because firms will fear the release of proprietary information is a
damaging admission. If they assume that corporations will engage in tax
avoidance to hide proprietary information, why not assume that they will engage
in tax avoidance for other reasons, which from their perspective, are equally
compelling? In short, the argument ultimately can be turned on its head in
support of the need for more disclosure rather than less.
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income tax returns. Proponents of the change had predicted that the
increased level of confidentiality would encourage more honest
reporting,
29 2
but apparently voluntary compliance actually decreased.
Contrary to the thesis that secrecy induces honest reporting, it could
be argued that if taxpayers are publicly accountable for the information
furnished on their income tax returns, their incentive to report truthfully
would be even greater. Publicity would increase the possibility that
employees, competitors, or other business persons will notice glaring
omissions and bring it to the attention of the tax authorities.
Public disclosure might actually discourage corporations from
minimizing their tax liabilities through tax avoidance techniques. For
public relations purposes, corporations required to disclose tax
information might be leery of paying only nominal amounts of tax. The
scrutiny of the public and the possibility that increased publicity would
aid taxing authorities in detecting illegitimate tax avoidance or fraud
could help safeguard the integrity of the corporate income tax.
In reality, little is definitively known about the effects of
confidentiality on taxpayer behavior and whether for this purpose large
corporations should be distinguished from small corporations and
individuals. Nor is tax disclosure defended by its supporters as a way of
increasing taxpayer compliance. 2 3 Tax withholding, information returns,
civil and criminal sanctions, and information sharing with other taxing
authorities all help to insure voluntary corporate compliance with tax
laws. The role played by the confidentiality of returns is simply
unknown. Accordingly, both the direction and magnitude of the impact
disclosure might have on corporate reporting, especially if only a limited
range of information will be published, are sheer speculation.

292. David E. Joyce, Raiding the Confessional-The Use of Income Tax
Returns in Nontax Criminal Investigations, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1251, 1267 (1980).

293. The Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue testified against that
state's disclosure law on the grounds it "will not help the Department of Revenue
do its job." Transcript of Public Hearing, Massachusetts Special Commission on

Business Tax Policy (June 1, 1993), at 65. Although disclosure might have some
benefit in highlighting transfer price abuses and cases of tax evasion, its real
benefits arise in focusing attention on the structure of the tax system. The
benefits of disclosure would remain the same even if every tax return were filed
in accordance with the law. Disclosure is concerned with the law itself and only
tangentially with how corporations comply with the law. In this sense, the focus is

different from the Progressives, who saw better tax enforcement as one of the
benefits to be gained from their advocacy of disclosure. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
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I. Will Disclosure Undercut a State's Business Climate?
Opponents of disclosure argue that it would reflect or exacerbate an
anti-business climate in the state. Disclosing corporate taxes would
antagonize the business community and fuel the hostility of its enemies.
Opponents argue that it would detract from the aura of goodwill that
creates a positive "business climate" and would provide one more weight
influence a corporation to
in the balance of factors that may ultimately
294
relocate its business to a friendlier state.
On a general level, this argument proves too much. Any legislation
that the corporate community opposes can be characterized as poisoning
the business climate. Obviously, in considering any legislative proposal,
the intended benefits must be weighed against possible deleterious
effects.
On a more specific level, evaluating this argument is difficult
because the factors that comprise a state's 'business climate" elude easy

analysis. Many considerations affect a corporation's view of a state's
business climate, and the issues important to one corporation may be
unimportant to another. Factors that might contribute to a specific
corporation's perception include the cost of energy, land, labor, or

294. Strauss argues that,
Given that other states do not require such public reporting and that
businesses prefer to keep such matters private, it would appear that
Massachusetts disadvantages itself viz a viz other states as a place in
which to do business, or to locate or expand in to do business. Certainly
holding constant other considerations which affect the business location
decision (cost and quality of labor, transportation costs and proximity to
markets, the tax costs and quality of various public services, the
regulatory environment etc.), the public reporting requirements are a
distinct disadvantage.
Strauss, supra note 182, at 13. He concludes that,
[The] newly enacted public reporting requirement is part of the history
and tradition in Massachusetts of general political and fiscal instability,
and that the legislative process often finds it convenient to target
business taxpayers. . . . Given Massachusetts' recent history of fiscal
instability, it would be prudent for firms considering to move into the
state or expand in the state to ascertain what else, in the areas of
corporate tax disclosure or tax policy, lies in store for them.
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transportation; zoning regulations; restrictions on construction; the
attitude of those public officials with whom a firm most often deals; the
speed with which telephone calls are returned from the public sector; the
degree of governmental regulations; the way businesses are treated by a
tax department's auditors; the level of civility that characterizes
interaction with government personnel; the amount of red tape that
exists; the number of forms and permits required; and the governmental
assistance provided to a new firm and its employees in relocating.2 9
Perceptions of business climate are also based on intangibles and
imponderables that defy easy analysis or quantification (e.g., personal
idiosyncrasies of executives). But unlike many of the factors that affect
the business climate the disclosure of corporate tax information would
not
296
affect the cost of doing business or a corporation's 'bottom line."
Many provisions in a tax code are adopted to improve the business
climate. Some of these provisions were even adopted at the specific
request of a corporation, in an attempt by a legislature to induce the
corporation to invest in a state or to remain or expand its operations in a
state. It is disingenuous to use the business climate argument in support of
the adoption of these provisions and then use the same argument to
prevent the public from evaluating in a meaningful way the effectiveness
of such provisions.
Even if disclosure were viewed as undercutting the business climate,
it is not clear what defensive actions a corporation would take. If
disclosure is limited to all publicly-traded corporations that do business
in the state, there would be two ways of avoiding this requirement. The
first method would be to cease doing business in the state by removing all
property and personnel and basically conduct a mail order business. 297
295. For a fuller discussion, see Richard D. Pomp, The Role of Tax Incentives
in Attracting and Retaining Existing Business, 29 TAX NOTES 521 (1985);
ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NEw YORK E CONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
WORKING PAPERS, No. 4 (1987), excerpted in 13 PEOPLE AND TAXES (September

1985).
296. The Massachusetts Staff Draft felt that the strongest argument against
tax disclosure was that it would strengthen the perception that a state is hostile to
business. As the staff report admitted, however, this argument is one of the most
difficult to evaluate "because it is premised on a potential reaction to a unique
piece of legislation that has yet to take effect."

MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT,

supra note 182, at 24. Despite this caveat, the Commission itself (as distinct from
the Staff) concluded that "corporate tax disclosure will destroy jobs if
corporations are required to reveal their identity in their tax reports." MAJORITY
REPORT, supra note 181, at 18. This type of incautious, hyperbolic statement
characterizes the Majority Report.
297. If the business involves the sale of tangible personal property, P.L. 86272 would ensure that no income tax return would have to be filed if the only
(continued)
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The second method would be to conduct business in a non-corporate form.
Both would be rather extreme reactions.298 If a corporation felt so
strongly about avoiding state disclosure that it would operate as a
partnership, presumably it would have already done so to avoid the
SEC's rules on disclosure. Of course, this option could be precluded if
disclosure were extended to partnerships above a certain size.299
Any legislative proposal to withdraw, albeit slightly, the cloak of
secrecy that protects the confidentiality of corporate income tax data
will be controversial. But not all businesses would resist such a proposal,
and some might actually welcome it, if only to dispel the negative image
that corporations are somehow tax freeloaders. Corporations that pay
little or no income tax might be few in number but yet, in the public's
mind, they may be seen as representative of business in general. Many
taxpayers would be unfairly tarred with the same brush. Disclosure of
tax information could help correct the perception that all corporations
are undertaxed and thereby enhance, rather than prejudice, attitudes
toward business. Moreover, some businesses might respect, if not welcome,
legislative efforts directed at examining an important component of the
state's revenue structure.
Should disclosure lead to a more level playing field, as it did at the
federal level in 1986, businesses in general will benefit. A state that
rewards corporations for their business decisions rather than their tax
decisions ought to be viewed as advancing the business climate.M

activities in the state were the solicitation of sales. If the business involves the
sale of services or intangible property, P.L. 86-272 would have no applicability.
298. Even state income taxes, which unlike disclosure, affect a corporation's
bottom line, have very little, if any, impact on where businesses locate or expand.
See Pomp, supra note 193, at 393-409. Accordingly, whether or not a state has a
disclosure law should not effect a corporation's decision to expand or relocate in
that state.
Further evidence that the disclosure issue is unlikely to affect anyone's
locational decisionmaking is found in a report. by Massachusetts Governor
Weld's office in collaboration with the University of Massachusetts. As part of
that study on the Massachusetts economy, over 2000 business persons were
interviewed. Not one raised the issue of corporate disclosure. See EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRs AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, CHOOSING
TO COMPETE (1993). Finally, a search of the Massachusetts newspapers in the

Nexis computer database failed to find any article about a company's relocation
to, expansion in, or relocation from Massachusetts which also mentioned the
disclosure issue.
299. See infra part W.A.
300. By way of evidence, there was substantial corporate support for the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. See supra note 3.
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Finally, the business community has some control over how the media
and corporations in other states will come to view a disclosure law. If the
business community characterizes a disclosure law as evidence of a state's
fiscal responsibility, its desire to introduce more responsibility and
openness into government, and its willingness to eliminate waste and
inefficiency in its tax system, the business climate should be enhanced
30
rather than undercut. '
J. Conclusion
This portion of the article examined the case for and against
disclosure. Based on CTJ's experience at the national level and the
limited state experience, state-level disclosure promises significant
benefits. The arguments against disclosure, many of which could also be
made (and in some cases have been made) against SEC-mandated
disclosure, do not provide any reasons to reject the case in favor of
publicly disclosing tax data. Some of the arguments against disclosure,
when analyzed, transform into arguments on behalf of disclosure.
Consequently, the next Section assumes that a state will consider
adopting some form of disclosure and discusses three major issues that
must be resolved in order to implement state-level disclosure: who
should be covered by disclosure; what information should be disclosed;
and which state agency should administer disclosure.

301. For example, the Massachusetts High Technology Council, one of the
most vocal opponents of disclosure, was criticized in 1989 for actually helping to
create a bad business climate. According to certain executives of high-tech
companies, "The [Council's] 10-year-long whine about excessive taxation in
Massachusetts has tarred the Council with a negative one-issue image that it
cannot shake .... But more pernicious than the anti-tax wailing, critics say, is the
council's poor-mouthing of the state's business climate for high-tech firms." Alex
Beam, Our Technology Graveyard; T.G.I.W., BOsTON GLOBE, July 26, 1989, at 21.
An author of a study on Route 128, Massachusetts' equivalent of Silicon Valley,
described the Council as "spread[ing] the bad image of the state far and wide. If
you say something is dying often enough, you hasten the problem along." Id.
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IV. FORMULATING A POLICY ON STATE DISCLOSURE

A. Who Should Be Covered By Disclosure?
This article has assumed that disclosure should extend to publiclytraded corporations but not individuals. Although situations occur where
the law requires financial information about individuals to be
disclosed,3a 2 individuals are generally perceived and treated as having
greater rights of privacy than corporations. The most compelling
arguments in the Congressional debate over public access to tax returns
involved individuals and their rights to privacy. There should be a
higher burden of proof for private citizens than in the case of publiclytraded corporations that disclosure of individual tax information
justifies the resulting loss of privacy. With the exception of individuals
who are the beneficiaries of significant tax expenditures, 303 this higher
standard does not justify the wholesale release of individual tax
304
information.
In addition to publicly-traded corporations, 30 disclosure should also
be extended to banks, utilities, and insurance companies, doing business in
a state, whether publicly-traded or not. These corporations are key
economic actors in a state economy in which the public already has a
special, well-established interest, as evidenced by the extensive
reporting and regulatory provisions to which these industries are subject.
Because they already submit extensive financial data to state
authorities, no new privacy issues or compliance burdens arise by bringing
30 6
them within the purview of a disclosure law.
302. For examples of the many situations in which the salaries of employees
are public information, see Linder, supra note 175, at 967-68.
303. See infra part B.
304. For an opposite view, see Linder, supra note 175 (advocating that the
income tax returns of millionaires should be published).
305. If disclosure were limited to only publicly-traded corporations, the law
would not cover subsidiaries of publicly-traded corporations (unless the
subsidiary itself were publicly traded). Publicly-traded corporations would have
the ability to avoid the law by creating a holding company to own their stock. To
reach these situations, disclosure must reach corporations that are controlled
directly or indirectly by publicly-traded corporations.
306. As part of his criticism of the Massachusetts statute, Strauss raises the
question whether it is "appropriate or compelling to have different public
disclosure standards for individuals viz a viz for profit and non-profit
organization?" Strauss, supra note 182, at 13. Strauss finds it "peculiar" that
Massachusetts requires organizations to report publicly but not individuals. Id.
at 11, 12. I would have thought it was too late in the'day to raise this question. For
(continued)
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Corporations that are publicly-traded on foreign exchanges but not on
United States exchanges also should be included for purposes of
disclosure. Many developed countries have financial disclosure laws
similar to those of the United States. Although in some cases these laws
may not be as detailed as those of the United States, the principle of
disclosure is well established. All the reasons for including United
States publicly-traded corporations within a disclosure law extend
equally to foreign-traded corporations. Treating both groups the same
preserves a level playing field.
In summary, at a minimum disclosure should cover publicly-traded
corporations, whether domestic or foreign, doing business in the state, and
banks, insurance companies, and utilities, doing business in the state,

decades now, we have demanded extensive reporting by publicly-traded
c6rporations and regulated industries with nothing comparable for individuals or
partnerships. Strauss raises the possibility of requiring a high level of disclosure
from both businesses and individuals. His reasoning is that,
[M]ost of the population is more familiar with the mechanics of filling
out individual income tax returns and the implied issues of equity and
tax avoidance which accompany various deductions and sources of
income. That greater knowledge and understanding should improve
the enforcement value derived from such public review, since the
general public would more readily understand this sort of information..
. The circumstances of many business tax returns, especially of those of
multistate businesses, are inherently more complicated. It is unlikely
that the general public understands Massachusetts business tax rules
or those of other states as well as it understands the tax rules governing
individual income taxes ....

Also I doubt the public appreciates the

considerable ambiguity in many state business income tax statutes. I
would guess, overall, that public understanding of state business tax
rules is in fact quite weak.
Id.
Strauss's arguments, could, of course, be used to justify disclosing corporate
tax information as part of educating the public. Moreover, the public did not
seem to have much trouble understanding the implications of the federal data
released by Citizens for Tax Justice preceding the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The fact
that some of the issues surrounding the corporate income tax are abstruse
perhaps explains the sorry state of many state tax laws, see Pomp, supra note
193, and, if anything, supports efforts at educating the public. Finally, and quite
surprisingly, Strauss does not mention or refer to the extensive reporting already
required by the SEC. The Massachusetts Staff Draft acknowledges, unlike
Strauss, that the appropriate balance between confidentiality and the public's
right to know may be different for corporations than for individuals.
M ASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT, supra note 182, at 11.
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whether publicly-traded or not. All of these corporations are already
accustomed to publishing detailed financial information about their
operations, including extensive data on their federal tax liabilities.
These corporations have long ago surrendered claims of confidentiality
and privacy regarding their financial affairs. Requiring the release of
state-specific information is a small additional compliance burden.
Some states might wish to extend disclosure to large corporations
that are privately-held, such as Bechtel, Egghead, Mars, Computerland,
Milliken, Montgomery Ward, UPS, American Standard, Revco,
WordPerfect, Caltex Petroleum, and Gateway Computers. Large,
privately-held corporations are key participants in a state's economy
and may also be responsible for helping to shape a state's tax regime.
Unlike small "mom and pop" corporations, large privately-held
corporations do not serve merely as the alter ego's of their owners. The
business matters of the corporation are not inextricably intermingled
with the individual shareholder's personal financial affairs. Moreover,
unlike a small "mom and pop" corporation, large privately-held
corporations can easily comply with a disclosure law. Accordingly, a
state could set forth certain criteria (e.g., assets, income, net worth) to
determine which privately-held corporations might be subject to
disclosure.
In the case of tax expenditures, those situations in which a state
"spends" money through special non-normative tax provisions, such as
tax credits or special deductions or exemptions, °7 disclosure should be
extended to all beneficiaries, corporate or individual, whether publicly
traded or not.308 The increased accountability and openness that would

accompany disclosure can properly be viewed as a legitimate requirement
of any entity or individual benefiting from the expenditure of public
funds. Indeed, one of the major arguments in favor of SEC-disclosure
applies equally to identifying the beneficiaries of tax expenditures:
The financial community, the accounting profession, the bar
and industry generally have come not only to accept but to
support the principle that those who make use of the public's
money must supply the information essential to the formulation
of intelligent investment decisions, and that it is a proper

307. See infra part B.

308. In many states, the salaries of state employees are public information.
See Linder, supra note 175, at 967. No distinction should be drawn between an
individual who receives one form of public expenditure (a salary) from an
individual who receives another form of public spending (a tax expenditure).
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responsibility of government to keep an eye on the accuracy and
adequacy of such information.
Further, identifying beneficiaries by name is consistent with the
philosophy underlying the concept of a tax expenditure. The major tax
expenditures tend to be investment-related subsidies, like an investment
tax credit. If these expenditures took the form of an explicit spending
program, the identity of the recipients would most likely be public
information either as part of the application process for the subsidy or
through freedom of information laws. Information that sensibly would be
made public as part of a spending program should be similarly disclosed
as part of a tax expenditure analysis. The public's right to know who is
receiving public funds should not be bypassed simply because benefits are
offered through the tax system rather than through direct spending
programs. To make the flow of information manageable, however, only
corporations or individuals receiving tax expenditures above a certain
aggregate amount should be subject to disclosure.
B. What Information Should be Disclosed?
1. Tax expenditures
Conceptually, any tax can be analyzed as if it consists of two distinct
structures. The first would be its normative structure; for example, those
provisions that are necessary parts of a tax structure intended to tax only
"income. '310 These provisions would include rules on defining gross
income, business deductions, the apportionment formula, and so forth. A
second set of provisions are known as tax expenditures. All governments
use the tax systems for more than just raising revenue. Tax laws typically
contain provisions intended to subsidize favored economic activities or to
relieve personal hardships. These provisions accomplish their goals by
granting a tax reduction to selected taxpayers.
Because these "subsidy" or "relief" measures are spending programs
implemented through the tax system, they commonly are known as tax
expenditures. 31 1 A tax expenditure can be viewed as if the taxpayer had
309. SEC DIscLosuRE

TO INVESTORS, supra note

241, at 46.

310. For a perceptive discussion of the definitional issues, see Michael J.
McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C.

DAVIs L. REV. 79 (1980).
311. The tax expenditure concept was first developed in the United States by
the late Professor Stanley S. Surrey of Harvard Law School. His work in this area
reflected his experiences as assistant secretary of tax policy under Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson as well as the insights gained through his other academic

(continued)

19931

TURNING THE CLOCK BACK TO THE FUTURE

actually paid the full amount of tax owed in the absence of the special
provision and had simultaneously received a grant equal to the savings
provided by the special provision. Characterized in this manner, a tax
expenditure is just one of a number of ways of providing governmental
assistance and should be reexamined periodically using traditional
budget and funding criteria: How much money is being spent; how is the
money being distributed; is the expenditure achieving its intended goal;
and is the expenditure the best means of achieving such a goal?
The concept of a tax expenditure is a powerful analytical tool that
has revamped traditional ways of viewing a tax system. One
application of the concept has been the compilation of a tax expenditure
budget, which identifies "subsidy" or "relief" provisions and estimates
their cost in forgone revenue.3 12 In 1968, the Treasury Department
published a tax expenditure budget analyzing the federal personal and
corporate income taxes. 313 In 1974, the Congressional Budget Office began
publishing its own annual tax expenditure report, and in the same year
the Office of Management and Budget began including a tax expenditure
analysis with the President's annual budget request to the Congress. No
doubt inspired by these federal actions, the concept of a tax expenditure
budget spread to the states. By 1993, twenty-two states prepared some
314
form of tax expenditure budget.
An unusually voluminous and fertile collection of literature exists on
the concept of a tax expenditure. 315 This literature makes a convincing
and scholarly pursuits. The tax expenditure concept has been described as the
"major innovation in tax and public finance during the last twenty or thirty years."
See Richard D. Pomp, The Mortgage Interest and Property Tax Deduction: A
Tax Expenditure Analysis, 1 CANADIANTAX 23, 23 n.1 (1979). The concept of a tax
expenditure was developed further by Paul McDaniel, a former professor of law
at Boston College Law School and a long-time collaborator of Surrey's. For a
discussion of state tax expenditures, see Richard D. Pomp, Rethinking State Tax
Expenditure Budgets,5 PUB. BUDGETING AND FIN. Mcrr 337 (1993).
312. The estimates are made on the assumption that a taxpayer's behavior
would remain unchanged if the tax expenditure were eliminated. While this
assumption might be unrealistic in some circumstances, a similar assumption is
implicit in stating the cost of explicit spending programs. For example, a job
retraining program that spends $100 is described as "costing" $100, even though
if the program were eliminated, the amount spent on some other program, such
as welfare, might increase.
313. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE
FINANCES, FISCALYEAR 1968, at 326-40.
314. Jean Harris, Tax Expenditure Report Titles and Sources, 5 PUB.
BUDGETING AND FIN. MGMT. 521 (1993).

315. For a small sampling of the literature on tax expenditures, see STANLEY
S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CoNcEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973);

Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the
(continued)
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case that unless attention is paid to tax expenditures, a state does not
have either its tax policy or its budget policy fully under control." 6 The
State of New York provides dramatic evidence of the correctness of this
warning. In 1969, New York adopted an investment tax credit ("ITC")
without any revenue estimate of its cost. By 1983, more than $660 million
in investment-related tax credits had been claimed by corporations. In
1982, the most recent year for which detailed data are available, two
corporations used nearly forty percent of the total amount of credits used
that year. 317 Until a 1985 report by New York's Legislative Tax Study
Commission, 318 the investment tax credit, estimated to cost $224 million
in 1993-more than the budgets of most state agencies-received less
review and analysis than did explicit spending programs that cost a
million dollars or less. For the 1986 liability year, eighty-two percent of
the credits earned in that year went to companies paying New York's
minimum tax.31 9 It is inconceivable that had the investment tax credit
been implemented as an explicit spending program, sixteen years would
have elapsed before any rigorous study was undertaken.
Without identifying the corporate beneficiaries, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to evaluate whether and to what extent a credit such as the
ITC, is helping or hurting a state. For example, are companies receiving a
credit for consolidating a factory while moving most of their operations
out-of-state? Is the credit encouraging the purchase of machines that
eliminate jobs?
Once a spending program is adopted in the guise of a tax provision, it
tends to escape the same level of accountability that is applied to
explicit expenditures. Because tax expenditures represent silent or back
door spending, which should be scrutinized annually at the same level as
explicit spending programs that are formally included in a budget, they
should clearly be part of any information that is disclosed on a
corporation-by-corporation basis. 32 ° This information is easily

Legislative Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (1980); McIntyre, supra note
310; SURREY & Mc DANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); PAUL R. Mc DANIEL & STANLEY
S. SURREY, (eds.) INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES:

A

COMPARATIVE

STUDY (1985). For a concise summary of the issues raised by the tax expenditure
concept and an extensive citation of the literatures, see STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL., I
FEDERAL INCOME T AXATION 232-54 (1986).

316. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 315, at 124.
317. See Pomp, supra note 193, at 635.
318. Id. at 615-72.
319.

N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, ANALYSIS OF A RTICLE 9-A

B USINESS C ORPORATION'S 1986 TAX CREDITS (1991).
320. This proposal was first made in Richard D. Pomp, State Tax Expenditure
Budgets-And Beyond, in STEVEN GOLD, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA FOR STATE TAX
(continued)
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understandable and explainable to legislators and should be of concern to
policy makers and analysts on an ongoing basis.
The type of information disclosed will be determined by the nature of
the tax expenditure. At a minimum, the amount of the special tax
provision claimed along with the resulting tax savings should be
disclosed by the name of beneficiary. 321 In the case of an investment tax
credit, for example, the amount of the credit claimed, the amount used,
the amount of any carryovers, and the amount of the investment that
triggered the credit should all be disclosed. 322 Similarly, if a credit is
based on a certain amount of employment, or research and development,
those amounts should also be disclosed. Depending on the nature of the
tax expenditure, the reasons leading to its adoption, plus other statespecific features surrounding its use, a state might wish to have other
information disclosed that would aid in evaluating the efficacy of the
tax expenditure.
2. Normative provisions
Normative provisions of a state corporate income tax are not
motivated by the same subsidy or relief considerations underlying the
adoption of tax expenditures. Nonetheless, normative provisions
represent a series of policy decisions and trade-offs among competing
values, such as administrative convenience, simplicity, equity, economic
neutrality, and efficiency. These trade-offs were often made decades ago
and remain memorialized in existing statutes. Recent developments and
trends challenge the premises underlying the trade-offs. These trade65 (1988); See Richard D. Pomp, Rethinking State Tax
Expenditure Budgets,5PUB.BUDGETING AND FiN. MGMT. 337(1993).
321. As discussed above, see supra part A, in the case of tax expenditures
there is no strong reason why disclosure should be limited to publicly-traded
corporations.
FOR STATE TAXREFORM

322. To be sure, the amount of the triggering investment could be calculated
based on the amount of the credit claimed. But there is no reason for third
parties to make this calculation when the information is readily available from
the taxpayer. Moreover, by requiring the taxpayer to disclose the amount of the
underlying investment, a check is provided in those cases where the credit might
have been miscalculated.
Under the Massachusetts law, a corporation discloses its Massachusetts
taxable income and its tax. It does not disclose its credits but the difference
between its taxable income multiplied by the tax rate and the tax paid is the
amount of its aggregate credits. This approach is acceptable in a state such as
Massachusetts, which does not have many credits. In other states it would be
more useful to have the corporation disclose the amount and identity of each of
its credits.
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offs need to be reexamined because of changes in the judicial climate; a
relaxation of federal controls, especially in the areas of transportation,
communications, and banking; startling advances in technology that have
facilitated innovative business practices; a flurry of federal tax
legislation; the rise of multinational corporations and conglomerates; and
323
the shift in the economy from manufacturing to service.
The nature of the information disclosed with respect to the
normative provisions of a tax might vary among the states because of
state-specific statutory differences. Nevertheless, although the states
vary in the details of their approaches, there are more similarities than
differences so that some general observations are appropriate.
At the least, it is useful to disclose any gaps between a corporation's
income for financial accounting purposes and its federal taxable income,
which to one degree or another is the starting point in calculating most
states' income taxes. Accordingly, a corporation might be required to
disclose its accounting book income and identify significant differences
between that amount and its federal taxable income.
Many provisions in a state income tax are automatically incorporated
from federal law. For example, with varying degrees of fidelity, all
states base their definition of taxable income upon the federal definition.
But provisions that are normative in the context of the federal system
may be problematic in the context of a state income tax.
Consider, for example, the so-called dividends received deduction.
For federal purposes, a corporation may deduct at a minimum 70% of the
dividends received from taxable domestic corporations; 80% may be
deducted if the dividends are received from a corporation in which the
payee owns at least a 20% interest; and 100% may be deducted if the
payee owns at least an 80% interest. 324 Many states track this feature of
federal law; 325 others provide even more generous treatment by allowing

326
a deduction for all dividends.
The deduction for intercorporate dividends serves as a useful example
because in most states it is a long-standing provision that rests on
questionable assumptions that should be reexamined. The normative
rationale for the federal dividends received deduction is the elimination
of multiple taxation. 327 The profits out of which the dividend is paid

323. See generally Richard D. Pomp, Tax Reform for the 80's, 16 CONN. L.
REv. 925, 926-28 (1984).
324. I.R.C. § 243 (1993).
325. See Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide (CCH) 1 79.
326. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-217 (1993).
327. See, e.g., BoRis I. BITTkER &JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXAnON
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 5-23 (1987). The deduction can also be
justified using non-normative criteria, such as making a state attractive for
(continued)
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have already been taxed at the federal level as income of the payor. A
legitimate policy question arises whether those same profits should be
taxed again at the federal level when received by the payee.
At the state level, however, the state levying a tax on
the payee is
not necessarily the same state that taxes the profits out of which the
dividend was paid. As an additional complication, even if the same
state taxed the profits out of which the dividend is paid, the business
apportionment factor of the payor is unlikely to be identical to the
business apportionment factor of the payee. 328 In other words, the
premises upon which the federal dividend received deduction is based
are not equally relevant in the context of a state income tax.
The dividend received deduction was purposely chosen as an
illustration. First, it nicely demonstrates the possibility of state law
going astray when it blindly mimics a federal provision. Second, the
dividend received deduction is the kind of long-standing tax provision
that escapes the attention of most legislators. Third, administrative
convenience, which often explains why a state incorporates a federal
provision, 329 does not carry much weight with respect to this deduction. A
corporation can easily in calculating its state taxable income add the
amount of its federal dividend-received-deduction, which appears on a
separate schedule on the federal corporate return. 330 Fourth, the state
dividend received deduction can result in the restructuring of a multistate
business for tax avoidance purposes.
For example, consider a corporation that is conducting a
multijurisdictional business, taxable in State A. Assume A allows a 100%
dividend received deduction. Orthodox tax planning would determine
whether the corporation could reduce its tax liability in A by
incorporating its out-of-state division and repatriating the profits of the
subsidiary as a tax-free dividend. 331 This type of tax planning might
well escape attention. 332

holding companies. Under this rationale, the provision would be properly viewed
as a tax expenditure. See McIntyre, supra note 310.
328. The text assumes that the dividends constitute apportionable business
income; other variations are possible. See generally JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, I
STATE TAXAInON,

§ 9.1-9.19 (1983).

329. For example, it would be difficult to imagine a state being able to
enforce rules on fringe benefits that deviated widely from the federal rules.
330. See Schedule C, Form 1120 (1992).
331. The incorporation of the out-of-state subsidiary will affect the taxable
income reported to A (assuming no combined report is applicable), the business
apportionment factor in A, as well as the taxable income and business
apportionment factors of other states with which the corporation has nexus
(again assuming no combined reports are applicable in these other states). The
(continued)
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In addition to the dividend-received-deduction, a state might well
be interested in identifying other provisions that it automatically
incorporates by using federal taxable income as its starting point.333 A
state might find that the reasons that led to the federal deduction might
carry little weight at the state level.
At present, most states probably have no information on the amount
or distribution of revenue they forgo by implicitly adopting features of
the Internal Revenue Code. Such information would not necessarily be
included in a tax expenditure budget. Disclosing by name of corporation
the amount that it benefits from a federal provision that had been
adopted by state law is a necessary first step in identifying which
provisions should be subject to a cost benefit analysis. In each state, tax
policy analysts, legislators and their staff, and tax administrators
should be able to identify which provisions in the corporate income tax
should be covered by a disclosure law.
Many states allow corporations to claim additional deductions in
moving from federal taxable income to state taxable income. The more
significant of these should also be Subject to disclosure.
After calculating state taxable income, a corporation typically
apportions that amount to a state using an apportionment formula. The
formula usually takes into account the percentage of a corporation's
property, payroll, and receipts attributable to the taxing state. The
components of this formula are useful for identifying both tax avoidance
techniques and long-run trends and should also be part of the information
disclosed.
For example, major corporations that have a low in-state receipts
factor may highlight a need for a state to examine the adoption of a
throw back or a throw out rule. Further, an abrupt change in a property or
creation of a subsidiary also lays the groundwork for using transfer pricing to shift
profits from A to lower taxed states.
332. A recent study of the Connecticut corporate income tax, which exempts
all dividends, calculated that one percent of corporate taxpayers reported 83.2%
of the total dividends. Three firms each reported dividends of more than $100
million. TASK FORCE ON STATE TAX REVENUE, FINAL REPORT-BUSINESS TAX 62-72
(1991). Some legislators on this task force were shocked by the existence of a
dividend-received-deduction and the accompanying data. Some of these same
legislators, however, had voted for the exemption when it was introduced in 1981.
333. Some federal provisions commonly incorporated into state law include
the deduction for state income taxes, see Richard D. Pomp, State Corporate
Income Taxes: The Illogical Deduction for Income Taxes, 42 TAx L. REV. 419
(1987); the net operating loss deduction, see I.R.C. § 172 (1993); the taxation of
DISCS and FSCS, see LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION AND
SIMPLIFICATION OF T AX ADMINISTRATION AND THE T AX LAW, T HE N.Y. TREATMENT OF
DISCS AND FSCS (1986); and the treatment of interest from state and local bonds.
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payroll factor involving a corporation that is known not to have changed
its operations significantly may also suggest the use of tax avoidance
techniques warranting further analysis. Data such as gross receipts, gross
sales, or gross profits can also be useful in identifying transfer pricing
abuses. 3341n order to further help identify possible transfer pricing
problems, corporations should disclose the names of any related
corporations with which they have had any transactions, and the nature
and extent of those transactions.
Specialized industries, such as insurance and banking, are typically
subject to special tax regimes. In many states, insurance companies are
subject to a tax on premiums rather than an income tax. Items subject to
disclosure will thus differ in these cases from what is required of general
business corporations.
Finally, corporations should have the right to explain any of the
disclosed information in further detail. Proper forms should be
developed and supplied upon which such corporations could supplement
and explain their disclosure data.
C. How Should the Mechanics of Disclosure Take Place?
Little is gained from procedures that require the public to request
affirmatively information from a state on specific corporations. Instead,
a state should publish whatever information is subject to disclosure in a
readily usable format.
If the information subject to disclosure is limited to items found on the
return, the tax department would be the logical agency to administer the
law. Presumably, the information would already be keypunched into
computers for use in audit selection. This information could be printed out
in a standard format and made available to the public.
A possible problem with this approach lies in whether it would
violate the section of the Internal Revenue Code that establishes
safeguards which a state must impose as a precondition to obtaining
federal returns or return information from the IRS.3 3 A violation of this
section would be serious because most states have entered into an
exchange of information program with the IRS, which provides state tax
administrators with valuable audit leads. The question that arises is
334. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
335. Specifically, a state cannot require a taxpayer to "attach to, or include in,
any State tax return a copy of any portion of his Federal return, or information
reflected on such Federal return, unless such State adopts provisions of law
which protect the confidentiality of the copy of the Federal return (or portion
thereof) attached to, or the Federal return information reflected on, such State
tax return." 28 U.S.C. § 6103 (p)(8)(A) (1993).

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[22:373

how to interpret this provision if a state law requires the disclosure of
information contained on the federal return, such as federal taxable
income.
In an informal opinion, the IRS told the staff of the Massachusetts
Special Commission on Business Tax Policy that as long as the Secretary
of State's office obtains the disclosed data from the reports filed with it
by corporations, which is what the Massachusetts law provides, there
would be no violation of the statute. The informal view of the IRS is
that it has entered into an information sharing agreement with the
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, which has no role in the
preparation of the taxpayer-specific reports that are disclosed. Under
the Massachusetts disclosure law, the Department of Revenue would be
honoring the agreements so that no violation would exist. 336 The

Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue independently reached the same
conclusion. 7
Although their opinions appear to be a technical interpretation of
the statute, both the Massachusetts Commissioner and the IRS reached
the right answer. The section of the Code at issue was introduced in the
aftermath of Watergate. The abusive use of income tax returns during
Watergate focused on individual returns and those of non-profit
organizations, rather than on corporate returns.
For example, the House Internal Security Committee examined the
tax returns of Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther
Party, the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the
Progressive Labor Party and the returns of officers of these groups. Other
government agencies made extensive use of individual returns. The
Senate Committee on Government Operations used tax returns for
investigations of riots, civil and criminal disorders and campus
disturbances. 338 The Civil Service Commission used tax-return data to
investigate job seekers; the Veterans Administration used returns to check
the income of pension claimants; the Federal Housing Administration
looked into the eligibility of families for housing assistance by
inspecting their income tax returns. Income tax returns were also
examined by the Federal Communications Commission in ferreting out

336.

MASSACHUSETTS STAFF DRAFT,

supra note 182, at 16-17. Amazingly, the

Commission report (as distinct from that of the Staff), fails to mention this
opinion and cites the possibility of jeopardizing the exchange agreements with
the IRS as one of the reasons for voting to change the current law. MAJoRITY
REPORT, supra note 181, at 22.
337. Transcript of Public Hearing, Massachusetts Special Commission on
Business Tax Policy (June 1, 1993), at 67.
338. See Who's Snooping Into Your Tax Returns Now?, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REPORT, Aug. 11, 1975, at 61.
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"payola" taken by disc jockeys and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
used returns to determine whether activities of savings and loan
associations and their staffs violated federal laws. The Securities and
Exchange Commission was a regular user of tax returns in its surveillance
of stockbrokers. The Small Business Administration used tax data to
decide on the merits of loan applicants and to assist in pressing for loan
repayments. Apparently, the biggest user of returns for routine law
enforcement purposes was the Social Security Administration. The
biggest users for investigative projects were the Justice Department and
U.S. Attorneys, who had easy access to tax returns. It was reported that
U.S. Attorneys inspected more than 18,000 individual returns in 1974.339
Because the Watergate abuses centered on individuals and not
corporations, it seems reasonable to read the relevant section of the Code
as being limited to individuals. 4° Also, because a corporation's federal
taxable income can be inferred from information contained in the Form 10K and in annual reports, there is no need for an overly broad reading of
the statute.
Moreover, suppose a state, instead of using the common approach of
requiring a corporation to use federal taxable income as its starting point,
actually adopted as state law all of the federal provisions that enter
into the calculation of federal taxable income but called this amount
"state taxable income." Suppose that the state now required disclosure of
that amount. It is hard to understand why that state should be denied
the benefits of the IRS exchange of information program because it chose
to disclose the amount of a corporation's state taxable income. Why
should a different result be reached just because a state chooses to avoid
the cumbersome process of explicitly adopting all of the federal
provisions that impact the definition of taxable income and incorporates
them by reference?
This last point supports not only the informal opinion of the IRS
regarding the Massachusetts disclosure law, but also supports the
position that no violation of the Code would result even if a tax
department were the agency that administered a disclosure law. Any
doubts on this matter could be resolved through an official pronouncement
by the IRS or through an amendment to the Code. Alternatively, the
entire issue could be avoided if the SEC were to mandate the disclosure of
more detailed information on state income taxes.
If the informal opinion of the IRS regarding the Massachusetts law
reflects official policy, a state will avoid violating the Code by
339. Id.
340. This reading is supported by the text of the statute which refers to "his
Federal return," suggesting that the draftspersons were concerned about
individuals. I.R.C. § 6103(p)(8)(A) (1993).
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following the Massachusetts approach of having a corporation submit
the required information to the Secretary of State (or some other person
or agency other than the tax department). If a state chooses to disclose
information that the tax department would not normally have because it
does not appear on the return, little loss in administrative efficiencies
would result if a corporation submits its information directly to the
Secretary of State.
The real advantage in having the tax department involved arises
from the assurance that the information being released is the same.
information appearing on the returns that were filed. If the tax
department is not involved in the process, adequate safeguards must be
provided to both ensure that all corporations covered by the law actually
file with the Secretary of State, and that the information submitted is
accurate. For example, a certified public accountant should be required to
attest to the accuracy of the information reported. In addition, a list of
publicly-traded corporations doing business in the state, as well as other
entities subject to disclosure should be published so that it could be crosschecked against those filing with the Secretary of State. The problem of
verifying the data released would be particularly acute if a state
adopted the Massachusetts proposal of anonymous disclosure, in which a
corporation is not identified by name but only by a number.3 41
CONCLUSION
The current debate over the disclosure of state corporate tax data has
hoary roots. At the national level, starting with the Civil War income
taxes, there has been a robust debate over the extent to which the public
should have access to federal tax information of both individuals and
corporations. This debate, however, primarily concerned not large
corporations but individuals and their rights of privacy; when
corporations entered the discussion at all, it was typically "mom and
pop" operations which could be viewed as the alter ego's of their owners.
The few times when Congress did concentrate on the differences between
individuals and corporations, it recognized that legitimate reasons
existed for granting more public access to corporate data than to
individual data.
The SEC has essentially resolved the federal debate by imposing
extensive financial reporting responsibilities on publicly-traded
corporations, including the release of detailed information on federal
income taxes and the aggregate amount of state income taxes that are
paid. Proposals for state-disclosure would require that the state income
tax information be disaggregated and presented in more detailed format.
341.

See supra part III.E.
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These proposals are intended to facilitate thoughtful tax policy making
and more accountability and openness in government. They would also
complement the SEC-mandated disclosure.
Compared with the much more extensive reporting burdens already
imposed on corporations by other federal and state statutes and the
amount of financial information now in the public domain, proposals for
state-level disclosure are unexceptional in terms of both the
administrative burden involved and the type of data covered. Further,
the virtues of disclosure were graphically demonstrated by the efforts of
CTJ at the federal level, which resulted in many of the corporate tax
changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Perhaps it is the fears of those
benefiting from flaws in the existing tax laws, more than any inherent
defect in the proposals, which explain the contentious opposition of
elements of the business community in Massachusetts, the one state that
has adopted a comprehensive approach to state disclosure. In theory,
the business community, as a whole, should be supportive of attempts to
improve and rationalize government policy making.
Most of the arguments against disclosure, similar to the arguments
often raised against proposals that threaten the status quo, involve the
incantation of threadbare and shopworn slogans. Others are based on
speculation and unsupported assertions. While opponents, who may not
speak for the entire business community in a state, are perhaps sincere in
their fears, their arguments fall well short of rebutting the benefits that
would accompany disclosure.
POSTSCRIPT
On January 4, 1994, Massachusetts amended its disclosure law to
substitute a numerical code for the actual names of corporations.3' 2 This
action was preceded by a series of stories in The Boston Globe analyzing
some of the returns that were filed under the old law. It was estimated
that 7000 companies would file disclosure reports by the December 31,
1994 deadline of the old law, but noncompliance was rampant. By the
deadline, only around 200 banks and insurance companies had filed, and
only 188 other corporations had filed.3
According to The Boston Globe's analysis, the reports showed that
some companies took hundreds of thousands of dollars in Massachusetts
tax credits intended to create jobs while they were laying off workers.
342. Frank Phillips & Scot Lehigh, Marathon Day Ends Lawmakers' Year:
Vote Down Tax Disclosure Law, Back Bone Marrow Transplant Measure,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1994, at 23; see supra parts II.A; II.E.
343. Meg Vaillancourt, Some Mass. Firms Took Big Tax Credits, Cut Jobs,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 1994, at 1.
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Also, the reports showed that the effective tax rate for Massachusetts
corporations varied widely. 4 '
In an interview with The Boston Globe, an executive of one
corporation that claimed substantial tax credits admitted that such
credits were not essential to the business expansion. "The credits are
largely symbolic. It's likely we would have expanded here anyway. But
the tax credits were an additional inducement to stay in
Massachusetts."''
The credits disclosed on the reports suggested that the
State may have underestimated the cost of corporate tax incentives,
especially the research and development credit. An analysis by the Tax
Equity Alliance for Massachusetts ("TEAM"), concluded that the total
tax credits could cost more than double the State's estimate.3
One-quarter of the 188 non-financial corporations filing reports paid
only the minimum corporate income tax of $456, which is substantially
less than what the average Massachusetts family pays.347 Commenting
on this, one former state revenue department official stated, 'This is
something corporations and the state tax department have known about
for some time. Now with the release of these forms, the public is finally
able to get in [sic] the dirty little secret of how favored corporations are
compared to individual taxpayers."348
Despite the explosive nature of the information revealed, some of
the corporations opposed to the disclosure law said they were more
concerned about its symbolism than the information they had to reveal.
The chief financial officer of Reebok International Ltd., for example,
said "It's not a big deal. With publicly traded corporations most of this
information is already available elsewhere, our real concern is what's
next? Once you know how much we pay in taxes, what will you demand
to know next?"'' 9 A spokesman for Gillette stated that "We are opposed
[to disclosure by name of corporation because] in principle... it adds
another layer of bureaucracy to doing business in Massachusetts.' ms°

344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. A study released by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue
analyzing 1990 data concluded that nearly three-fourths of the companies filing
tax returns paid the minimum tax. Kimberly Blanton, 75% of Firms In-State Paid
Minimum Tax: Supporters of Disclosure Say 1990 Figures Show Need for Law,
B OSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 1994, at 1.
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Meg Vaillancourt, Shift in Tax Law Worries Some Now Downplaying
Data Disclosure, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 1994, at 31.
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